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The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review
David A. Strauss†
Constitutional interpretation, as it is usually conceived, looks to the past—to an
old text, to history, to precedent, to tradition—in an effort to limit political majorities.
But over the last generation or so, a different approach to the Constitution has emerged.
That approach, which might be called modernization, tries to anticipate trends in public
opinion instead of taking lessons from the past; and a modernizing court, instead of
facing down popular majorities, yields when it finds out that it has misgauged public
opinion. This modernizing approach has characterized the Supreme Court’s recent
work in many disparate areas, including, among others, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the limits on sex discrimination imposed by the Equal Protection Clause. Perhaps most interesting, the substantive due
process decisions of the last forty years are modernizing decisions, unlike the pre–New
Deal substantive due process decisions to which they are often, mistakenly, compared.
Modernization is an appealing approach in many ways. Among other things, it
holds out the hope of more easily reconciling judicial review with democracy. But modernization also raises serious questions. There are questions of institutional competence—anticipating trends in public opinion sounds like a politician’s job, not a
court’s—although there may be less to this objection than meets the eye. Perhaps the
more important objections are that modernization may distort the political process, and
it may cause courts to be too willing to accommodate what they perceive as the demands of popular opinion, at the expense of a principled judicial role.

INTRODUCTION
Constitutional interpretation looks to the past. It looks to an old
text, to old precedents, to the views of the founding generations, to tradition. Judicial review is a matter of articulating principles rooted in
these sources to limit the power of current popular majorities. That is the
1
conventional wisdom. But over the last generation or so, a very different
† Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law
School.
I am grateful to participants in workshops at the Harvard, University of Virginia, University
of Michigan, and University of Chicago Law Schools, and to Mary Anne Case, Barry Cushman,
Elizabeth Emens, Richard Fallon, Barry Friedman, Don Herzog, Christine Jolls, Michael Klarman,
Jacob Levy, Eric Posner, Richard Primus, Adam Samaha, Kirsten Smolensky, Geoffrey Stone, Cass
Sunstein, John Sylla, and Adrian Vermeule for comments on earlier versions of this Article. I also
thank Mark Sherman and Karen Courtheoux for excellent research assistance and the Sonnenschein Faculty Fund at The University of Chicago Law School for financial support.
1
People who disagree on practically everything else about how to interpret the Constitution
agree on some version of this. See, for example, Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal
Courts and the Law 37–47 (Princeton 1997) (asserting that a constitution’s “whole purpose is to
prevent change—to embed certain rights in such a manner that future generations cannot readily
take them away”); Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitu-
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form of judicial review has quietly emerged—an approach that, more or
less consciously, looks to the future, not the past; that tries to bring laws
up to date, rather than deferring to tradition; and that anticipates and
accommodates, rather than limits, developments in popular opinion.
This approach, which might be called modernization, has not been
fully avowed by the Supreme Court, and it does not characterize every
area of constitutional law. But it is the dominant approach in many important areas—notably the highly controversial area of so-called substantive due process, the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and the limits on gender discrimination derived from the Equal Protection Clause. In many other
areas—the Commerce Clause, the religion clauses, constitutional criminal procedure, and other aspects of the Equal Protection Clause—
modernization seems to be an important part of the story.
Modernization is, I believe, an instinctive response by the courts
to the persistent criticism that judicial review cannot be reconciled
2
with the core principles of democratic government. That criticism has
led some people, today as in the past, to call for the more or less com3
plete abolition of judicial review. Modernization, to a greater degree
than any other theory that preserves a substantial place for judicial
review, provides an answer to that criticism. Whether it is a good answer is unclear. It is also unclear, in my view, whether modernization
goes too far in accommodating popular majorities at the expense of
other principles that the courts should enforce. But whatever its faults,
tion 1–12 (Harvard 1996) (suggesting that the courts should look to “the broad story of America’s
historical record” and there search for a moral meaning underlying certain phrases in the Constitution); Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations 34–162 (Harvard 1991); id at 98 (“Think
of the American Republic as a railroad train, with the judges . . . sitting in the caboose, looking
backward.”); Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar
of Politics 27 (Bobbs-Merrill 1962) (noting that the courts are charged with the “creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating and developing impersonal and durable principles”
and arguing that the courts are better equipped to handle this task than elected institutions).
2
For a celebrated example of the criticism, see Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at
16–23 (cited in note 1) (arguing that judicial review is “counter-majoritarian” and works against
the representative bodies by putting power in the hands of judges). For an account of how the
criticism became commonplace, see Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 Yale L J 153, 157–62 (2002) (tracking
the history of criticism of judicial review from the 1800s through the present).
3
See Adrian Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation 230–89 (Harvard 2006) (suggesting a modified version of judicial review in which the courts
“should enforce the Constitution only where, as the nineteenth-century legal scholar James Bradley
Thayer suggested, no reasonable basis for interpretive dispute exists”); Jeremy Waldron, The Core
of the Case against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L J 1346, 1353, 1369–1406 (2006); Larry D. Kramer, The
People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 128–44, 249–53 (Oxford 2004);
Mark V. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution away from the Courts, 6–31, 163–72 (Princeton 1999).
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there is reason to believe that the modernizing approach to judicial
review is, today, a central theme in constitutional law.
Modernization, as an approach to judicial review, has two components. The first component is that the courts will strike down a statute if
it no longer reflects popular opinion or if the trends in popular opinion
are running against it. Modernization tries to anticipate developments
in the law, invalidating laws that would not be enacted today or that will
soon lose popular support. Second, as an important corollary, a modernizing court must be prepared to change course—and uphold a statute
that the court previously struck down—if it becomes apparent that
popular sentiment has moved in a different direction from what the
court anticipated. The courts do not, of course, assert a general power to
modernize; there must be some basis in the text of the Constitution or,
since the text contains provisions that allow a great deal of latitude, in
the precedents interpreting the text. That is, modernization, like other
approaches to judicial review, is a way of giving content to vaguely
worded constitutional provisions and of shaping requirements drawn
from precedent.
In fact, I believe modernization has become a kind of default posture for the courts when they cannot identify other principles that should
define their role. Perhaps in response to the relentless criticism of judicial
review as antidemocratic, the courts have, both consciously and unconsciously, shaped constitutional law so as to reduce the degree of confrontation between the judiciary and the elected branches. If the courts are
doing no more than bringing statutes up to date, and anticipating changes
that have majority support—and if they are prepared to retreat if the
majority turns out not to support them—then judicial review has, in
principle, a more comfortable place in democratic government.
I will begin by sketching the modernizing approach briefly, and
then showing it in action in some of the areas I mentioned—the Eighth
Amendment, the constitutional law on gender discrimination, and
substantive due process. The modernization account is, I think, most
impressive in its ability to explain recurrent puzzles about substantive
due process: why the courts seem to have revived a doctrine that was
so thoroughly discredited at the end of the New Deal era; why the
modern cases deal with matters relating to family and intimate relationships; what principle underlies these cases; and how the courts’
activity in this area can possibly be reconciled with a commitment to
majoritarian democracy.
Then I will try to assess modernization as an approach to judicial
review. Perhaps contrary to appearances, modernization is neither
necessarily a centralizing approach nor necessarily a “progressive”
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approach, either in the sense that it is aligned with a certain political
tendency or in the sense that it leads to progress; some notorious and
universally repudiated decisions in the Supreme Court’s history can
be understood as modernizing. Finally, I will ask whether modernization is a role that courts are institutionally suited to play and whether it
is the role that courts ought to play. Notwithstanding the obvious objection—that it is absurd for unelected, life-tenured judges to second-guess
elected politicians’ views about current trends in public opinion—my
answer to the first question, about institutional capacity, is a qualified
yes. My answer to the second question—whether this is the best role
for judges to play in a democracy—is more skeptical. I will try to support that skepticism with two concluding examples of arguable instances of modernization: the two most famous decisions of the last
4
5
fifty years, Brown v Board of Education and Roe v Wade.
I. THE ELEMENTS OF MODERNIZATION
The first component of modernization is that the constitutionality
of a statute depends in large part on whether the statute, although still
on the books, is a product of a bygone era and is no longer supported by
a political consensus. For a modernizing court, several kinds of evidence
bear on this question. Since the statute was enacted, have attitudes
changed in a way that suggests that the measure no longer enjoys political support? Does legislation in related areas suggest that the views
reflected in the challenged statute are no longer widely held? Is the
statute still enforced, and, if not, does the nonenforcement suggest a
lack of popular support? Is there a national trend that has left this
statute an outlier, not found in other jurisdictions—thus suggesting
that even if the statute enjoys local support, it is out of touch with sentiment in the society at large, on a subject on which local variation is
not likely to persist? The Supreme Court’s opinions in a number of
areas of constitutional law show great sensitivity to questions like
these—sometimes characterizing them as evidence of “tradition,” even
though they are concerned with the present and the future, rather than
the past.
The second component of modernization is that the Court, having
decided that a statute is unconstitutional because it is out of step with
current popular sentiment, will change course if it turns out that the
Court’s judgment was mistaken and the statute had popular support
4
5

347 US 483 (1954).
410 US 113 (1973).

File: 05 Strauss MINI Flip 05.21

2009]

Created on: 5/22/2009 10:19:00 AM

Last Printed: 5/22/2009 2:26:00 PM

The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review

867

after all—that is, if the political process pushes back against the Court’s
decision. The point is not so much that the Court announces, in advance and in so many words, that it will reverse itself if it encounters
popular resistance. Rather, the Court structures the principles it announces so that they incorporate a sensitivity to the political reaction.
Perhaps the clearest example, which I will discuss in more detail shortly, is the cases in which the Court initially held that capital punishment, as then practiced in the United States, violated the Eighth
Amendment just because it was imposed so infrequently and erratical6
ly. When states responded by enacting laws that provided for the
more frequent and systematic use of capital punishment, the Court
could—quite consistently with the principle of its earlier decisions—
7
allow capital punishment to be reinstated.
Modernizing decisions do not always (or even generally) acknowledge that they are doing these things. Modernization is, as I suggested,
a sort of reflex at this point, which is to say that courts do it with varying degrees of awareness. Sometimes the doctrine is more explicit in
stating that the courts are modernizing and in leaving the door open to
an adverse reaction from the political branches; sometimes the doctrine
is not explicit but nonetheless operates that way in practice.
In either event, however, it would be a mistake to suppose that
modernization can be done without making judgments of value, morality, or social policy. The decision whether a law is out of keeping with
popular sentiment is not simply a factual judgment. No one thinks that
a court should strike down a law if, for example, more than 50 percent
(or any other number) of those who responded to a public opinion
poll disapproved of it. A court cannot say that a law is out of keeping
with popular sentiment without tacitly invoking some conception of
democracy—some idea about how much legislative inertia is warranted,
or about the influence that intensely interested groups should have, for
example, or about what kinds of legislative compromises should be allowed and how popular views should be aggregated.

6
See Furman v Georgia, 408 US 238, 291 (1972) (Brennan concurring) (citing to the decline in
the imposition of the death penalty since the 1930s and concluding that “[t]he outstanding characteristic of our present practice of punishing criminals by death is the infrequency with which we resort
to it”).
7
See Gregg v Georgia, 428 US 153, 194–96 (1976) (noting that minimal guidelines on mitigating and aggravating factors were sufficient to overcome the Furman Court’s problem with the
“freakish” application of the death penalty); Proffitt v Florida, 428 US 242, 252–53 (1976) (holding that allowing a judge to consider mitigating and aggravating factors when sentencing a defendant to death, along with state supreme court review, was not unconstitutional); Jurek v Texas,
428 US 262, 268 (1976) (holding that the death penalty is not per se cruel and unusual).
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Similarly, the modernization approach is, to a degree, selective.
The courts will endorse some future trends but not others; they will
suppress some outliers but not others. Those decisions will reflect views
about the desirability of different policies as a matter of morality and
social policy. In some modernizing cases, the Supreme Court has been
8
explicit about this. But it is unavoidable—certainly in practice, and
probably in theory—that a court trying to identify laws that are losing
popular support will be influenced by its own views of what laws ought
to lose popular support and that a court’s willingness to retreat in the
face of an adverse popular reaction to its decisions will be influenced
by whether that reaction is, in its view, reasonable or wholly misguided. Modernization is distinctive not because it can avoid judgments of morality and policy—no approach to constitutional law
can—but because it requires that such judgments be supported not by
the past, not by traditions or original understandings, but by (what the
courts perceive as) emerging trends and future developments.
II. MODERNIZATION IN ACTION
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Probably the most overt adoption of the modernization approach
has occurred in cases interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
9
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Almost a century ago, the Supreme
Court declared that that Clause “is not fastened to the obsolete, but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a hu10
mane justice” and that the Clause should be interpreted to enforce
“the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur11
ing society.” These formulations, with their emphasis on evolution,
enlightenment, and progress, are almost an explicit statement of the
modernizing approach. The text of the Clause does not compel such
an approach. The term “unusual” might be read to suggest modernization—particularly the hostility to outliers that is a feature of modernization—but the Supreme Court has not attached great significance to
that word, mostly treating it as just an elaboration of the term

8
See, for example, Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 563 (2005). See also id at 574–75 (stating
that the Court will “bring its independent judgment to bear” on the question whether a punishment is cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
9
US Const Amend VIII (“[N]or cruel and unusual punishment [shall be] inflicted.”).
10 Weems v United States, 217 US 349, 378 (1910).
11 Kennedy v Louisiana, 128 S Ct 2641, 2649 (2008), quoting Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 101
(1958) (plurality).
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12

“cruel.” Modernization is one among many plausible ways to interpret the text. This is typical of how modernization works: the courts
interpret an open-ended text to provide for some form of modernization, and the approach then takes root in the precedents.
In keeping with the modernization paradigm, the Supreme Court
has, in many Eighth Amendment cases, first tried to determine whether the challenged form of punishment was losing support in popular
opinion. The Court has considered whether the punishment was a relative outlier, whether it had fallen into disuse, and whether the trend
was to disapprove of it.
The Supreme Court’s most recent cases interpreting the Eighth
13
Amendment illustrate this approach. Last term, in Kennedy v Louisiana,
the Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a
person convicted of the crime of raping a child, when the crime did
14
not result in the child’s death. The Court began its analysis by surveying the laws of various states and concluding that “44 States have not
15
made child rape a capital offense.” Then the Court considered
whether there was “a consistent direction of change in support of the
death penalty for child rape” because “[c]onsistent change might
16
counterbalance an otherwise weak demonstration of consensus.” The
Court’s conclusion on this point was that “in the last 13 years there
has been change towards making child rape a capital offense . . . [as]
evidenced by six new death penalty statutes, three enacted in the last
17
two years.” But the Court concluded that this trend was insufficiently
strong, in view of the Court’s precedents, to sustain the constitutionali18
ty of the practice. Finally, the Court said that “[t]here are measures of
consensus other than legislation,” such as “[s]tatistics about the number of executions,” which “may inform the consideration whether capital punishment for the crime of child rape is regarded as unacceptable
19
in our society.” The Court noted that no one had been executed for
child rape, or any other “nonhomicide offense,” since 1964, and that

12

See, for example, Trop, 356 US at 100 n 32.
128 S Ct 2641 (2008).
14 Id at 2646.
15 Id at 2652.
16 Id at 2656.
17 Kennedy, 128 S Ct at 2656.
18 See id at 2656–57 (noting that the data in Atkins v Virginia, 536 US 304 (2002), revealed a
much more significant indication of change regarding the execution of mentally retarded criminals).
19 Kennedy, 128 S Ct at 2657.
13
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only two defendants, both in Louisiana, had been sentenced to death
20
in that period.
After considering this evidence, the Court explicitly stated—again
consistent with the modernization approach—that these data about the
existence of trends in public opinion, while “entitled to great weight,” do
not “end [the] inquiry” into whether a law violates the Eighth Amend21
ment. The Court’s own judgments—about “decency” and “respect for
the individual,” and about whether the death penalty for child rape
22
served the legitimate purposes of capital punishment or created “systemic concerns,” such as a heightened risk of executing an innocent
23
person —also played a role.
The Court took a similar approach when it held, in Roper v Sim24
mons, that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of individuals
who were younger than eighteen years old when they committed the
25
crime. The Court said that the “beginning point” in interpreting the
26
Eighth Amendment “is a review of objective indicia of consensus.”
These indicia were “the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the
majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on
the books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the
27
practice.” The Court noted that thirty states rejected the juvenile
death penalty, including eighteen that allowed the death penalty in
28
other circumstances. In those states that formally permitted the juve29
nile death penalty, “the practice is infrequent”; only three states had
30
executed juveniles in the previous ten years. The Court commented
that while the pace of abolition of the juvenile death penalty was not
31
“dramatic,” the “direction of the change” was consistent, something
that the Court considered especially notable in view of “the particular
trend in recent years toward cracking down on juvenile crime in other

20

Id.
Id at 2658.
22 Id.
23 Kennedy, 128 S Ct at 2663 (citing evidence that children are especially vulnerable to
suggestive questioning techniques and easily coerced about issues related to “body touch” and
other abuse, leading to inaccurate testimony).
24 543 US 551 (2005).
25 See id at 581.
26 Id at 564.
27 Id at 567.
28 See Roper, 543 US at 559–60.
29 Id at 564 (drawing a parallel between the evidence of national consensus against the
juvenile death penalty and that against the death penalty for mentally retarded criminals).
30 Id at 565.
31 Id at 565–66.
21
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32

respects.” The Court also noted the international consensus against the
33
34
juvenile death penalty (and was much attacked for so noting ). In all of
these ways, the Court showed an intense concern with public opinion,
and in particular with the trends in popular opinion.
The Court, to its credit, made no pretense of formalism; it was
explicit in saying in Roper, as it did in Kennedy, that it was also making its own judgment about the acceptability of the juvenile death pe35
nalty. But the holding that the juvenile death penalty was unconstitutional, like the holding about child rape, did not rest on that judgment
alone; the Court’s analysis leaves no doubt that it would not have invalidated the death penalty in these cases without the “indicia of consensus” and evidence of the trends in opinion. The Court’s own views
were adduced to support and confirm views about capital punishment
that were derived from national and (to a small degree, in Roper) international opinion. This is a clear example of modernization: the effort to identify, and promote, an already existing trend that the Court
believes is a good one.
The Court’s approach in Kennedy and Roper paralleled its opi36
nion in Atkins v Virginia, which held that a state may not execute a
37
mentally retarded person. In Atkins, the Court noted the relatively
small number of states that permitted the execution of mentally retarded people and the infrequency with which even those states ex38
ecuted such individuals. The Court concluded that the execution of
mentally retarded offenders “has become truly unusual, and it is fair
39
to say that a national consensus has developed against it.” Only then
did the Atkins Court, like the Kennedy and Roper Courts, bring its
“own judgment . . . to bear on the question of the acceptability of the
40
death penalty.” Both Atkins and Roper overruled relatively recent

32

Roper, 543 US at 566.
See id at 575–78.
34 See, for example, Ernest A. Young, Comment, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 Harv L Rev 148, 148–49 (2005). See also Roger P. Alford, Agora: The United States
Constitution and International Law: Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution,
98 Am J Intl L 57, 61 n 30 (2004) (predicting the influence of international opinion in the Court’s
consideration of the juvenile death penalty).
35 See id at 564 (noting the importance of an independent assessment of disproportionality
of punishment).
36 536 US 304 (2002).
37 See id at 318–21.
38 Id at 314–15.
39 Id at 316.
40 See Atkins, 536 US at 312.
33
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41

precedents, explicitly on the ground that, after those earlier cases
were decided, the challenged uses of capital punishment became less
42
accepted in society generally. This is, again, an explicitly modernizing
approach—one that looks to current trends, not tradition or even
43
precedent. The plurality opinion in Thompson v Oklahoma, which
held capital punishment unconstitutional for offenders who were under the age of sixteen at the time of the crime, took essentially the
same approach, emphasizing that no state that had explicitly addressed the issue had set an age lower than sixteen, that juries very
seldom imposed the death penalty on offenders of that age, and that
the last execution of such a young person had been carried out forty
44
45
years earlier. Indeed Stanford v Kentucky, the case that Roper overruled, examined many of the same data as Roper but reached the opposite conclusion at what Roper viewed as an earlier stage in the evo46
lution of the national consensus.
These Eighth Amendment opinions—Kennedy, Roper, Atkins, and
Thompson—did not explicitly leave open the possibility that the Court
might retreat if the trend it perceived reversed itself and more and
more states began adopting the forms of capital punishment of which
the Court disapproved. But that element of modernization is clearly
implied by the logic of the opinions; if there were to be a large-scale
movement toward executing juveniles or the insane, the Court, if it
were faithful to the approach it took in Roper and Atkins, would have
to acquiesce—not, to repeat, as a matter of abandoning principle in
the face of irresistible popular pressure, but because the Court’s own
principle would require such a retreat.

41 See id at 321 (overruling Penry v Lynaugh, 492 US 302 (1989), which held that the execution of mentally retarded criminals does not violate the Eighth Amendment); Roper, 543 US
at 574 (overruling Stanford v Kentucky, 492 US 361 (1989), which held that the execution of a
juvenile does not violate the Eighth Amendment).
42 See Atkins, 536 US at 314–16 (stating that many state legislatures began to prohibit the
death penalty for mentally retarded criminals after the Penry decision); Roper, 543 US at 574
(asserting that “[t]o the extent Stanford was based on review of the objective indicia of consensus that obtained in 1989, it suffices to note that those indicia have changed”).
43 487 US 815 (1988).
44 See id at 826–33 (plurality).
45 492 US 361 (1989).
46 Compare id at 370–71 (noting that the empirical data did not sufficiently indicate a
trend away from executing juveniles), with Roper, 543 US at 565–66 (pointing to the trend away
from executing juveniles since Stanford and noting that even the governor of Kentucky commuted Stanford’s sentence).
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47

Just that scenario played out a generation ago. In 1972, in Furman
48
v Georgia, the Court declared that capital punishment, as then practiced in the United States, was “cruel and unusual” and therefore un49
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Only two justices, however, concluded that the death penalty was cruel and unusual in all
50
circumstances. The other members of the majority emphasized, in
varying ways, that the death penalty was applied in an unpredictable
51
and arbitrary fashion.
At the time, the Court had reason to believe that popular support
for capital punishment in the United States was diminishing; that view
was reflected in the opinions and, even more explicitly, in the private
52
papers of some of the justices. Between 1960 and 1972, an average of
15 people were executed each year, compared with an average of 167
53
in the 1930s, 128 in the 1940s, and 72 in the 1950s. Four states ab54
olished the death penalty in the 1960s; in the early 1970s, the California and New Jersey Supreme Courts held that capital punishment vi55
olated their states’ constitutions. The constitutional flaw that the
47 For a comprehensive account, see generally James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death:
The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963–2006, 107 Colum L Rev 1 (2007).
48 408 US 238 (1972) (per curiam).
49 Id at 239–40 (reversing the death penalty sentences of the defendants).
50 See id at 305–06 (Brennan concurring) (suggesting that, because the majority of criminals are punished sufficiently by imprisonment, there is no justification for the death penalty in a
few instances); id at 358–60 (Marshall concurring) (asserting that the American people find the
death penalty to be “morally unacceptable”).
51 See id at 253 (Douglas concurring) (asserting that under current laws, no standards
govern the imposition of death, where people are sentenced “under the whim of one man or of
12”); id at 309–10 (Stewart concurring) (noting that application of the death penalty is so unusual that it can be said to be “wantonly” and “freakishly” imposed); id at 313 (White concurring) (noting that the death penalty is imposed too infrequently to be “of substantial service to
criminal justice”).
52 See Furman, 408 US at 299 (Brennan concurring) (“[T]he history of this punishment is
one of successive restriction.”); id at 313 (White concurring) (asserting that capital punishment
had “for all practical purposes run its course”); Del Dickson, ed, The Supreme Court in Conference (1940–1985): The Private Discussions behind Nearly 300 Supreme Court Decisions 617–18
(Oxford 2001) (describing a conference among the justices, where Brennan and White noted that
public opinion against the death penalty had been growing).
53 See Furman, 408 US at 291 (Brennan concurring).
54 In the 1960s four states completely abolished capital punishment: Michigan in 1963,
Oregon in 1964, and Iowa and West Virginia in 1965. An additional three states significantly
reduced their use of capital punishment: New York and Vermont in 1965, and New Mexico in
1969. See id at 372 appendix 1 (Marshall concurring).
55 See People v Anderson, 493 P2d 880 (Cal 1972); State v Funicello, 286 A2d 55 (NJ 1972).
The US Supreme Court itself, in 1968, had made a small move in the same direction, holding that
states could not disqualify potential jurors who had reservations about the death penalty, unless
they were unequivocally unwilling to impose it. See Witherspoon v Illinois, 391 US 510, 521–22 &
n 21 (1968).
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Court identified—the arbitrary and unpredictable enforcement of the
death penalty—could be attributed to the increasing unpopularity of
the death penalty; capital punishment had so little support that its imposition was basically a matter of happenstance. That state of affairs,
56
the key justices said, violated the Constitution.
Within four years of Furman, thirty-five states had reenacted death
57
penalty statutes. The new statutes were drafted specifically to address
the concern about excessive discretion and arbitrariness that had led
58
the decisive members of the Court to vote as they did in Furman. In
1976, the Court upheld some of these statutes, effectively reinstating
59
capital punishment in the United States.
The Court did not explicitly say that it was modernizing, but the
Court’s treatment of capital punishment conforms almost exactly to the
modernization paradigm. In Furman, the Court invalidated capital punishment on grounds that reflected the judgment that capital punishment no longer had popular support. Indeed, that judgment was central to the Court’s approach in Furman. But Furman left a way for a
subsequent court to uphold capital punishment if that perception
proved false and the states reaffirmed their belief in the death penalty—which, the Court concluded in 1976, they did. People who think the
Court should have done more than modernize—for example, that the
Court should simply have concluded that capital punishment is cruel
and unusual in most or all circumstances—will not hold such a favorable view of this episode. But it is a clear illustration of both aspects of
the modernizing approach to judicial review.
B.

Sex-based Classifications and the Equal Protection Clause

Modernization has also become the governing approach to laws that
discriminate on the basis of sex. The courts’ embrace of modernization
in this area is not quite as clear as it is in the capital punishment cases.
But there is still plenty of explicit evidence in the opinions that, whatever
the official doctrinal formula, modernization is what’s actually going on.
At first glance sex discrimination and capital punishment might
seem like an odd couple. What the two subjects have in common,
though, is that at the time of the key decisions in both areas it seemed
56

See Furman, 408 US at 239–40 (per curiam).
See Gregg v Georgia, 428 US 153, 179–80 & n 23 (1976).
58 See id at 179–80.
59 See, for example, Jurek v Texas, 428 US 262, 276 (1976) (upholding a capital punishment
statute in Texas); Proffitt v Florida, 428 US 242, 252–53 (1976) (upholding a capital punishment
statute in Florida); Gregg, 428 US at 194–96 (upholding a capital punishment statute in Georgia).
57
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that public attitudes were rapidly changing. That turned out to be true
for sex discrimination; the Supreme Court did not have to back down
the way it did in the capital punishment cases.
The black-letter standard for judging sex classifications under the
60
Equal Protection Clause is, of course, “intermediate scrutiny,” which
requires that such a classification be “substantially related” to “impor61
tant governmental objectives.” But it is something of an open secret that
sex classifications are sometimes unconstitutional even if they do seem to
62
have a substantial relationship to an important objective. Some sex classifications are based on statistically valid generalizations—such as the
generalization that women are more likely to be interested in becoming
63
nurses than men, or that women are more likely than men to be eco64
nomically dependent on their spouses. The Supreme Court has, for
example, twice invalidated statutes that presumed that widows, but not
widowers, were dependent on the earnings of their deceased spouses,
even though that classification seems obviously to have a substantial
relationship to an important objective—the objective of protecting dependent surviving spouses without either incurring large administra65
tive costs or spending money on spouses who were not dependent.
The more plausible reason for the unconstitutionality of these sexbased classifications is suggested by some of the other things that the
Court has said—that the statutes rest on generalizations that, while they
may be statistically true, embody “archaic,” “traditional,” or “stereotyped” views about men’s and women’s roles, or on “old notions” that are

60 US Const Amend XIV (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”).
61 See Mississippi University for Women v Hogan, 458 US 718, 724 (1982) (noting that the
burden is on the party seeking to uphold a policy that discriminates on the basis of gender). See
also, for example, Nguyen v Immigration and Naturalization Service, 533 US 53, 60–61 (2001)
(concluding that the statute in question met the intermediate scrutiny standard); United States v
Virginia, 518 US 515, 533 (1996).
62 See, for example, Nguyen, 533 US at 76 (O’Connor dissenting) (“[O]verbroad sex-based
generalizations are impermissible even when they enjoy empirical support.”); J.E.B. v T.B., 511
US 127, 139 n 11 (1994) (noting that, even with statistical support, some stereotypes may violate
the Equal Protection Clause); Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 199 (1976); Weinberger v Wiesenfeld,
420 US 636, 645 (1975) (noting that although the idea that men are the primary breadwinners
enjoys empirical support, it is insufficient as the basis of an irrefutable presumption).
63 See Hogan, 458 US at 726–29 (noting that 98 percent of all registered nurses were women, according to a 1981 statistic issued by the US Census Bureau).
64 See, for example, Califano v Goldfarb, 430 US 199, 205–06 (1977); Weinberger, 420 US at 645.
65 See Goldfarb, 430 US at 201–02 (invalidating a statute providing survivors’ benefits, where
a widower could recover only if he was receiving at least half his income from his deceased wife, but
where a widow could recover without any showing of support); Weinberger, 420 US at 638–39.
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66

inconsistent with “contemporary reality.” These are the terms that suggest that what is actually going on is modernization. The problem with
the sex-based classifications that the Court struck down was not that they
failed to promote important objectives; the problem was that those classifications reflected “archaic,” “traditional” views, or “old notions.” Those
statutes were the product of a bygone era and were no longer in keeping
with current views—“contemporary reality”—about sex roles.
The justices knew that there were significant changes in popular
attitudes about, among other things, women’s participation in the
workforce, which increased sharply in the United States beginning in
67
the late 1960s. There were concomitant changes in the law, such as
the enactment of antidiscrimination laws and the elimination of many
68
gender classifications. All of the “archaic” statutes that the Court invalidated had been enacted before these developments, and most of
them reflected traditional views about women’s role in the economy.
By the same token, when the Supreme Court has upheld sex classifications, it has sometimes suggested that it was doing so because it
had confidence that the classification was the product of a present-day
69
decision. In Califano v Webster, for example, the Court upheld a provision of the Social Security Act that seemed very similar to a provision
70
it had invalidated just a few months earlier in Califano v Goldfarb.
Part of the Court’s explanation was that the legislative history of the
Webster provision showed that it, unlike the Goldfarb provision, was
“not ‘the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about
females,’ but rather was deliberately enacted to compensate for par-

66 See Goldfarb, 430 US at 207; Stanton v Stanton, 421 US 7, 14 (1975); Weinberger, 420 US
at 645; Schlesinger v Ballard, 419 US 498, 508 (1975).
67 See, for example, Frontiero, 411 US at 685 n 15, 689 n 23 (citing statistics about women’s
increased presence in the workforce); Stephanie Seymour, Women As Constitutional Equals: The
Burger Court’s Overdue Evolution, 33 Tulsa L J 23, 26–28 (1997) (discussing the societal changes
that occurred between 1961 and 1971); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U
Cin L Rev 1, 3–15 (1975) (noting that in 1971, the courts first began to carefully examine “sex
lines” drawn by legislation); US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Work Experience of the Population, 1969 45 (1971); Sophie C. Travis, The U.S. Labor Force: Projections to
1985, 93 Monthly Lab Rev 3, 3 (1970) (noting that the pace of women entering the workforce
began to pick up in about 1965).
68 See, for example, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub L No 92-318, 86
Stat 373, codified at 20 USC § 1681 (making gender discrimination unlawful in many instances in
the education context); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 253,
codified in relevant part at 42 USC § 2000e-2 (making gender discrimination unlawful in the
employment context); Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub L No 88-38, 77 Stat 56, codified at 29 USC
§ 206(d) (making differences in wages due to gender unlawful).
69 430 US 313 (1977).
70 430 US 199 (1977).
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71

ticular economic disabilities suffered by women.” In other words, the
constitutionality of a sex classification would depend on whether it
was enacted in an earlier era, before attitudes about women’s role
changed, or in circumstances that reflected the influence of presentday thinking about sex roles.
In its most important sex discrimination case—United States v
72
Virginia, which declared unconstitutional Virginia Military Institute’s
exclusion of women—the Court emphasized that VMI’s single-sex
policy had been adopted at a time when women were routinely consi73
dered unfit for many occupations. At first glance, it is not clear why
that mattered. The people who thought women were unfit to be lawyers, for example, were wrong; but it does not follow that the people
who thought that women could not be accommodated in a certain
kind of military training were also wrong. The Court’s emphasis on the
contemporaneity of these different kinds of sex discrimination seems,
superficially, to be an exercise in something like guilt by association.
But modernization makes sense of the Court’s approach. The problem
with the exclusion of women from VMI was not that it was based on
mistaken factual claims about the effect that the admission of women
would have on military education. The courts, in reality, are not well
equipped to evaluate those claims. Rather, the point is that the decision to exclude women from VMI was made in an era when attitudes
74
were so different from what they are today.
The Court in Virginia also established, as a principle, that sexbased classifications cannot be justified by post hoc rationalizations
that did not reflect the reasons that the classifications were actually
75
adopted. This principle is not always applied even when constitutional rights are at stake; the Court has ruled that it does not apply to
76
measures restricting commercial speech or abortion, for example.

71

Webster, 430 US at 320, quoting Goldfarb, 430 US at 223 (Stevens concurring).
518 US 515 (1996).
73 See id at 536–38, 542–45 (noting that the legal and medical professions once were
thought to be inappropriate for women).
74 In fact, Virginia had appointed a commission to reexamine state higher education policy,
and VMI itself undertook such a reexamination. But the Court concluded that neither of those
reexaminations established a modern, acceptable justification for excluding women from VMI.
See id at 539.
75 See id at 533, 535–36, 539 (noting that the justification must be genuine and not merely
in response to litigation).
76 See Bolger v Youngs Drug Corp, 463 US 60, 70–71 (1982) (stating that the government may
advance new justifications for prohibiting contraceptive mail advertisements, even though those
justifications were not asserted during the original enactment of the statute). See also Doe v Bolton,
72
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Again the reason for the principle is not entirely clear; one might have
thought that the question should be whether a classification is in fact
justified, not whether the people who adopted it had good reasons.
But the ban on post hoc rationalizations does make sense if the governing principle is modernization. Under the modernization approach, the objective is to ensure that a policy truly reflects a presentday political decision, made according to present-day ideas about
women’s role in society and the economy. By prohibiting post hoc rationalizations, the Court makes it less likely that a sex-based classification will be upheld solely on the basis of a present-day rationalization
of a decision made in an earlier era for “archaic” reasons.
The Court’s opinion in Virginia also carefully left open the possibility that it would allow sex segregation in education in certain cir77
cumstances. This, too, is characteristic of the modernization approach;
it reflects a similarity between the sex discrimination cases and the
Eighth Amendment cases. The Court’s willingness to consider whether
sex-segregated education might be constitutional demonstrates that its
concern was not with the justifiability of sex-segregated education in
general, but with whether a policy of sex-segregated education was
modernized—whether it was the product of current ways of thinking
and not a holdover from earlier times.
All-male colleges providing a form of military education were
once common, but by the time VMI’s status was challenged, VMI was
78
one of only two such institutions —suggesting, again, that VMI could
be characterized as a relic from an earlier time. The Court’s opinion
suggested this point, too. The Court cited “[w]omen’s successful entry
79
into the federal military academies” as a reason to believe that VMI
could successfully adapt to the admission of women. The Court also
noted that the opponents of admitting women to VMI echoed predictions about the destructive effects of women on the culture of the institution that had been made by the opponents of admitting women to
the military academies and that, according to the Court, turned out to
80
be false. Justice Scalia’s dissent urged that VMI’s outlier status was in
fact a reason to uphold VMI’s policy; private institutions in Virginia
offered single-sex education to women, but only VMI offered such an

410 US 179, 190–91 (1973) (noting that the state could attempt to justify an abortion statute as protecting fetal life, even though the historical justification for the statute focused on the woman’s safety).
77 See Virginia, 518 US at 533 n 7.
78 The other was The Citadel, in South Carolina. See id at 569 (Scalia dissenting).
79 Id at 544.
80 Id at 542 n 11.
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81

option to men. But the Court thought that VMI’s outlier status just
confirmed that VMI belonged to a bygone era.
C.

Substantive Due Process

“Substantive due process” is the name given to the use of the Due
82
Process Clause to invalidate statutes on the ground that they infringe
fundamental rights, even though those rights are not enumerated in the
Constitution. It seems fair to say that, over the last one hundred years,
substantive due process has been the most controversial doctrine in
constitutional law. In the first third of the twentieth century, the Due
Process Clause was used to protect the freedom of contract, notably in
83
now-repudiated cases like Lochner v New York. Since the late 1960s,
substantive due process has been identified with rights involving reproduction, bodily integrity, sex, and the family: the right to contracep84
85
tives, the right to an abortion, and, recently, the right to be free from
86
prohibitions on same-sex sodomy.
The modern substantive due process cases are puzzling in several
ways. Why did the Court revive a doctrine that the post–New Deal generation repudiated more thoroughly than any other doctrine in constitutional law? Why is modern substantive due process preoccupied with
a set of issues that have in common only a general connection to sex and
family life? And what principle, if any, is guiding the law in this area?
Modernization provides an answer to these questions. The Court
did not in fact revive the pre–New Deal doctrine, because the pre–New
Deal cases were not modernizing; the late twentieth- and early twentyfirst-century cases are modernizing decisions, and for that reason,
they are, contrary to much received wisdom, fundamentally unlike
87
the pre–New Deal cases. Present-day substantive due process has focused on issues like contraception, abortion, and homosexuality for the
81

See Virginia, 518 US at 579 (Scalia dissenting).
US Const Amend XIV (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . .”).
83 198 US 45 (1905) (striking down a New York law that set the maximum number of hours
bakers could work).
84 See Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding that Connecticut antibirth-control laws violate the constitutional right to “marital privacy”).
85 See Roe, 410 US at 164–67 (holding that failure to make allowances for different stages
of pregnancy is sufficient to render a state law outlawing abortion unconstitutional).
86 See Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558, 578–79 (2003) (overruling Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US
186 (1996), which held that prohibitions on same-sex sodomy did not violate the Constitution).
87 For perhaps the best-known example of the received wisdom that modern substantive due
process cases, like Roe v Wade, are essentially indistinguishable from the pre–New Deal cases, see
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 14–15 (Harvard 1980).
82
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same reason that modernization became the dominant approach in
the gender discrimination cases: these are subjects on which attitudes
have undergone a rapid change over the last few decades. And modernization is, I believe, the central unifying theme of the substantive
due process cases that have been decided in the last forty years. Of
course, attitudes have changed on many subjects; a change in popular
attitudes alone is not sufficient to produce modernizing decisions in
constitutional law. But the law has for a long time protected interests
in bodily integrity and in the composition of the family, so legal materials were available to support constitutional principles that invalidated statutes that were outliers or that seemed archaic. And, it appears, these were modernizing changes of which the justices generally
approved as a moral matter.
I will consider the substantive due process cases in the order they
were decided, except for the abortion decisions, which of course have
dominated the debate over modern substantive due process. The abortion cases demonstrate, with particular clarity, some of the risks of the
modernization approach, so I will discuss them later, in connection with
an overall evaluation of the virtues and demerits of modernization.
1. Griswold v Connecticut.
88

Griswold v Connecticut, the first of the modern substantive due
process decisions, declared unconstitutional a Connecticut statute that
made it unlawful for any person, including married people, to use any
89
contraceptive drug or device. All of the justices in the majority concluded, on one basis or another, that the Connecticut statute infringed
on an implied fundamental right to privacy in the marital relation90
ship. Justice Black, in dissent, accused the Court of reviving Lochner
91
by inventing rights not found in the Constitution.
Griswold, once intensely controversial, seems to have become
generally accepted. Modernization aside, there was some basis for the
Court’s conclusion that the Connecticut statute infringed on a constitutional right associated with marriage. The textual support for that
right was weak, but there were precedents suggesting that the Constitution protected an individual’s, or a family’s, autonomy in matters of
88

381 US 479 (1965).
Id at 485–86.
90 See id at 485 (Douglas); id at 486–87 (Goldberg, Warren, and Brennan concurring); id at
500 (Harlan concurring); id at 502–03 (White concurring).
91 Id at 515–16 (Black dissenting) (arguing that the Court relies on the same “natural law
due process philosophy” found in Lochner, which many later decisions have repudiated).
89
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92

reproduction and the raising of children. There was also a strong
normative case to be made that the Connecticut statute was illadvised, or worse, as a matter of policy.
But modernization provides the best basis for the fundamental
right that the Court established in Griswold. The Connecticut statute
was a conspicuous outlier; apparently no other state had a statute like
Connecticut’s. Justice Harlan, who concurred with the result in Griswold, said that for him this fact—“the utter novelty of” the Connecticut
statute—was “conclusive. . . . Although the Federal Government and
many States have at one time or another had on their books statutes
forbidding or regulating the distribution of contraceptives, none, so far
93
as I can find, has made the use of contraceptives a crime.” By the time
the case was brought, the statute was not enforced against married
couples—suggesting that it in fact lacked political support (just as the
nonenforcement of capital punishment laws later suggested, mislea94
dingly, that those laws lacked political support). Justice Harlan made
this point as well: the lack of enforcement, he said, shows that the state
“either . . . does not consider the policy of the statute a very important
one, or . . . does not regard the [statute] . . . as [an] appropriate or ne95
cessary” means of furthering that policy. The statute was relatively
easily evaded by individuals, because Connecticut permitted the use of
contraceptive devices for purposes other than contraception, such as
the prevention of disease—further evidence that the state was not
96
serious about the law, or at least so some justices thought. And the

92 On reproduction, see Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 541–43 (1942) (holding that the
compulsory sterilization of larcenists, but not embezzlers, violated the Equal Protection Clause).
On children, see Pierce v Society of the Sisters, 268 US 510, 530–35 (1925) (holding unconstitutional
an Oregon statute requiring public—as opposed to private—education for children between the
ages of eight and sixteen); Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 400–03 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a
state statute that prohibited teaching students in a language other than English).
93 Poe v Ullman, 367 US 497, 554–55 (1960) (Harlan dissenting) (citing also international
evidence of the unusual nature of the statute in question). In his concurring opinion in Griswold,
Justice Harlan said that the Connecticut statute was unconstitutional “[f]or reasons stated at
length in my dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman.” 381 US at 500.
94 The statute did, however, force a number of family planning clinics to close down; Griswold
itself was a prosecution of officials of such a clinic. See Mary L. Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control
in the Connecticut Supreme Court before Griswold v. Connecticut, 75 Iowa L Rev 915, 917–20 (1990)
(discussing the political climate surrounding birth control before, during, and after Griswold).
95 Poe, 367 US at 554 (Harlan dissenting). See also Griswold, 381 US at 506 (White concurring in the judgment) (referring to the “total nonenforcement . . . and apparent nonenforcibility”
of the statute against married couples).
96 Griswold, 381 US at 506–07 (White concurring).
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trend in other jurisdictions was toward the liberalization, or the non97
enforcement, of laws regulating contraceptives generally.
This defense of Griswold is different from—in a sense broader
than—the argument that the holding in Griswold (and Lawrence v
98
Texas, the most recent substantive due process decision) can be reached
just on the ground that the statute was not enforced—that is, on a consti99
tutional counterpart to the common law doctrine of desuetude. Desuetude, or the infrequent enforcement of a statute, can be good evidence that a statute is the product of an earlier era—that it is out of
keeping with current sentiment and in need of modernization. But a
lack of enforcement is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of
the need for modernization. Some statutes are infrequently enforced
for reasons besides their lack of popular support; in fact, some restrictions may be unenforced because they are so universally accepted that
they are hardly ever violated, such as laws forbidding slavery or cannibalism.
At the same time, the fact that a restriction is enforced does not
mean that modernization is unwarranted. An enforcing agency’s decisions may not reflect popular sentiment, just as the legislature’s failure
to repeal a measure might not reflect popular sentiment. Especially if
the stakes are low, both may be just a product of inertia. If laws do not
impose criminal penalties or other severe burdens, or if they affect only
a small class of people, vigorous enforcement may be tolerated even if
the laws are quite unpopular. A law might continue to be supported,
and enforced, just because it has not become salient and been reexamined; that may have been true of many sex classifications, for example. And a locally popular measure, condemned by national sentiment,
might be vigorously enforced. To the extent the modernization approach should suppress outliers, it therefore cannot depend solely on a
lack of enforcement.
In Griswold, however, all of these elements—the lack of enforcement, the trend away from regulation, and the law’s status as an
outlier—coincided. That explains why Griswold can comfortably be
seen as a modernizing decision. It also explains why the Court did not
97 See Peter Smith, Comment, The History and Future of the Legal Battle over Birth Control, 49 Cornell L Q 275, 277–79 (1964) (noting the variety of legislative tools employed in US
jurisdictions other than Connecticut).
98 539 US 558 (2003).
99 On Griswold, see Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 143–56 (cited in note 1). On
Lawrence, see Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality,
and Marriage, 2003 S Ct Rev 27, 29–30, 48–52, 54–60 (finding three primary strands of reasoning
in Lawrence, one of which was desuetude).
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have to be concerned with the other component of modernization,
leaving itself room to retreat if the political branches pushed back. In
view of the narrow holding in Griswold—confined explicitly to the use
of contraceptives by married couples—the chance of an adverse reaction from state governments was minimal.
If Griswold can be justified as a modernizing decision, then the
assertion that Griswold recapitulates Lochner—which was the standard criticism of Griswold, and a concern acknowledged even by its
100
defenders —seems almost bizarrely wide of the mark. The pre–New
Deal Court used substantive due process to resist what it saw as a
pernicious trend—on one account, a trend toward what that Court
saw as interest group legislation that betrayed both the public interest
and the principle of “free labor” that inspired the antislavery move101
ment. The trend was pernicious, in that Court’s eyes, precisely because it was widespread, because laws regulating the employment relationship were so popular, and because those laws had an extensive
102
and profound effect on labor markets.
The Griswold Court, by contrast, was following, not resisting, a
trend. The law it invalidated was an isolated outlier that was enforced
only in a limited way even in Connecticut. No one suggested that that
statute was popular; even the dissenters in Griswold (in notable contrast to some of the dissenters in the pre–New Deal cases) did not
have a good word to say for the Connecticut statute as a matter of
103
policy. The idea that the repudiation of Lochner shows the error of
Griswold should be turned inside out: what Griswold shows is that if
the Lochner Court had confined itself to regulatory measures that

100

See, for example, Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 73, 221 n 4 (cited in note 87).
See generally, for example, Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and
Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence (Duke 1993); William E. Nelson, The Impact
of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87
Harv L Rev 513 (1974). See also Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism,
85 BU L Rev 881, 999 & n 655 (2005).
102 See, for example, Gillman, The Constitution Besieged at 127–29 (cited in note 101) (describing the Lochner Court’s concern that legislatures would enact extensive legislation favoring
employees over employers).
103 See Griswold, 381 US at 527 (Stewart dissenting):
101

I think this is an uncommonly silly law. As a practical matter, the law is obviously unenforceable, except in the oblique context of the present case. As a philosophical matter, I believe the use of contraceptives in the relationship of marriage should be left to personal and
private choice, based upon each individual’s moral, ethical, and religious beliefs. As a matter
of social policy, I think professional counsel about methods of birth control should be available to all, so that each individual’s choice can be meaningfully made. But we are not asked
in this case to say whether we think this law is unwise, or even asinine.

File: 05 Strauss MINI Flip 05.21

884

Created on: 5/22/2009 10:19:00 AM

The University of Chicago Law Review

Last Printed: 5/22/2009 2:26:00 PM

[76:863

were isolated, unpopular outliers that were essentially indefensible on
104
policy grounds, its approach might never have been repudiated.
2. Eisenstadt v Baird.
105

Eisenstadt v Baird, decided seven years after Griswold, invalidated a Massachusetts statute that forbade the distribution of contraceptives to any unmarried person. The Massachusetts law therefore
differed from Griswold’s Connecticut statute in two ways: it applied to
distribution, not to use; and it applied to unmarried individuals. Eisenstadt has come to be understood as extending the substantive due
106
process right established by Griswold in these two ways —an extension that, in view of the reasoning of Griswold, is quite substantial.
In some respects, the modernizing character of Eisenstadt is obvious. The trend toward the liberalization of the regulation of contraceptives had continued in the years since Griswold. The Massachusetts
statute also did not apply to the distribution of contraceptives for the
purpose of preventing the spread of disease and, as the Court noted,
107
that meant that the statute was easily evaded. There was evidence
108
that it was hardly enforced, in any event.
Eisenstadt, however, was not written as a substantive due process
decision. The Court purported to rely on the Equal Protection Clause.
Specifically, it purported to hold that there was no rational basis for
109
the statute’s distinction between married and unmarried couples. In
fact, it was utterly implausible to say that the statute failed the extremely lenient rational basis requirement as that requirement is
usually applied under the Equal Protection Clause. As I noted, Eisenstadt quickly came to be treated not as an equal protection case but as
a decision expanding the substantive due process right.
Why did the Court choose the implausible equal protection basis
for Eisenstadt? No doubt part of the reason was the old concern about
Lochner: the Court was reluctant to be seen as inventing, or expanding, a right that had no clear textual basis. But perhaps equally important, the equal protection approach gave the Court a chance to retreat
104

See David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U Chi L Rev 373, 382–86 (2003).
405 US 438 (1972).
106 See, for example, Lawrence, 539 US at 565; Vacco v Quill, 521 US 793, 809–10 (1997) (Souter concurring in the judgment); Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 720 (1997); Bowers, 478 US
at 190–91; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 851 (1992).
107 Eisenstadt, 405 US at 448–49.
108 See Smith, Comment, 49 Cornell L Q at 286–87 (cited in note 97).
109 See Eisenstadt, 405 US at 448–49 (noting that the state’s supposed goal of creating “virtuous” and sexually healthy men and women did not justify differential treatment of single people).
105

File: 05 Strauss MINI Flip 05.21

2009]

Created on: 5/22/2009 10:19:00 AM

Last Printed: 5/22/2009 2:26:00 PM

The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review

885

if there had been a hostile political reaction. An important lesson of
the Lochner era was that the Equal Protection Clause, unlike the
substantive use of the Due Process Clause, does not wholly prevent
the political branches from regulating an activity but just requires that
110
they go about the regulation in a different way. By relying on the
Equal Protection Clause, Eisenstadt left the door open for a state legislature to reassert its power to regulate the distribution of contraceptives to minors, provided it did so in the right way.
Specifically, the Court in Eisenstadt gave two reasons for its conclusion that the Massachusetts statute was not rationally related to the objective of deterring premarital sex. First, the Court said, the fact that
contraceptive devices could be distributed for purposes of disease prevention meant that the statute was “so riddled with exceptions” that it
111
had “at best a marginal relation” to deterring premarital sex. Second,
since fornication was only a misdemeanor, the state could not possibly
have meant to “prescribe[] pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted
112
child as punishment for fornication.” These rationales provided the
political branches with a way to strike back and provided the Court a way
to acquiesce had the legislature done so. If the legislature had forbidden
the distribution of contraceptives outright, eliminating the loophole for
health-related use, that would have made the statute constitutional, on
the Court’s own reasoning. And the legislature also had the option of
increasing the penalty for fornication, which would have undermined—
and permitted the Court to retreat from—its second argument.
It seems unlikely that the Court actually contemplated an adverse legislative reaction; probably by the time of Eisenstadt it was
clear enough that the Massachusetts law was an anachronism and that
its invalidation would be accepted. But still, the exceedingly questionable use of the Equal Protection Clause evinced a desire to mute the
confrontation with the political branches by portraying the unconstitutionality of the statute as the product of the legislature’s own choices, and therefore remediable by the legislature. In that respect, Eisenstadt displayed the amenability to legislative revision that is characteristic of modernization. More important, Eisenstadt, like Griswold, was
surely influenced by the perception that attitudes toward contraception had changed and that the Massachusetts law no longer enjoyed
substantial political support.
110 See Railway Express Agency, Inc v New York, 336 US 106, 112–13 (1949) (Jackson concurring).
111 Eisenstadt, 405 US at 448–49.
112 Id at 448 (asserting that such a legislative assumption was “plainly unreasonable”).
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3. Moore v City of East Cleveland.
113

Moore v City of East Cleveland invalidated a municipal singlefamily zoning ordinance that had the effect of sometimes preventing
grandparents from living in the same home as their grandchildren when
the parents did not also live there. There was no majority opinion, but
Justice Powell’s plurality opinion has been treated as if it were an opinion of the Court and has come to be regarded as a significant subs114
tantive due process holding.
The East Cleveland ordinance was an outlier. Single-family zoning laws are ubiquitous, but East Cleveland was apparently unique in
the nation in applying such an ordinance to prevent a grandparent from
living with grandchildren. Justice Stevens, in a separate concurrence,
reached that conclusion after exhaustively examining cases from other
115
jurisdictions, and he urged that the ordinance violated the Due
Process and Takings Clauses principally for that reason. The plurality
opinion did not emphasize the fact that the East Cleveland ordinance
116
was an outlier, but it did note that the ordinance was “unusual” and
repeatedly referred to the anomalies that the ordinance would produce: for example, large numbers of adults might, in some circumstances, constitute a permitted “single family,” and a grandparent could
live with grandchildren who were siblings but not grandchildren who
117
were, like those in Moore, cousins.
For the most part, the plurality followed Justice Harlan’s Gris118
wold concurrence and Poe v Ullman dissent in emphasizing tradition:
“Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of
the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply
119
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” The plurality obtained
precise lessons from tradition, which, it said, did not merely support
the “sanctity” of the nuclear family: “The tradition of uncles, aunts,

113

431 US 494 (1977) (plurality).
See, for example, Lawrence, 539 US at 593 (Scalia dissenting); Glucksberg, 521 US at 727
n 19; Michael H. v Gerald D., 491 US 110, 121–24 (1989); Pala Hersey, Moore v. City of East
Cleveland: The Supreme Court’s Fractured Paean to the Extended Family, 14 J Contemp Legal
Issues 57, 62 (2004) (“[T]he Moore plurality’s position has played a prominent role in some of
the Court’s most important decisions on Substantive Due Process.”).
115 Moore, 431 US at 516–521 (Stevens concurring) (concluding that there is no precedent
for applying an ordinance to exclude an owner’s relatives from residing on his property).
116 Id at 495 (plurality) (noting the odd and complex section of the statute at issue, in which
it defines “family” as only including certain related individuals).
117 Id at 520 (Stevens concurring).
118 367 US 497 (1960).
119 See id at 503 (plurality).
114
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cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with
parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserv120
ing of constitutional recognition.” But it is hard to believe that tradition alone, or the Court’s precedents alone, would produce such a
fine-grained result. How can one establish that a “venerable” tradition—let alone one “equally venerable” to the tradition of the nuclear
family—supports a family arrangement like the one in Moore? The
Court does not appear to have collected, for example, survey data on
the prevalence of such family arrangements; and even such data would
not establish that there was a “venerable” tradition “deserving of constitutional recognition” as opposed to, for example, a common but
widely disapproved practice.
It looks as if “tradition” here was standing for the justices’ belief,
manifest in the opinion, that the East Cleveland ordinance was simply
unreasonable—that it was an excessive, heartless measure that was not
needed to solve any real problems. In this connection, the striking feature of Moore—the feature that relates it to modernization—was how
the Court viewed the fact that the East Cleveland ordinance was an
outlier. That fact might have caused the Court to hesitate before concluding that the ordinance was a gratuitous and unreasonable interference with the family. If a law is unique, it might be a carefully designed
response to specific local problems, and in any event it will be relatively
easy for individuals to escape its reach by going elsewhere. For example, according to one observer’s account, East Cleveland was a predominantly African-American working class suburb of Cleveland that
was trying to maintain the stability of its neighborhoods in the face of
an influx of disorganized poor families from Cleveland, and the re121
strictive zoning law served that purpose.
The Court, however, took the opposite view of the ordinance’s
outlier status: it regarded the ordinance’s outlier status, including its
apparent anomalies and peculiar definitions, as a reason to invalidate
the ordinance. This is consistent with the way the Court treated outliers
in Griswold and United States v Virginia (and Lawrence, which I discuss below.) The Court is comfortable invalidating laws on substantive
due process grounds when it thinks it is acting consistently with the
general trend of popular sentiment and that popular opposition to its
decision will be limited. The ordinance’s outlier status confirmed the

120
121

Id at 504.
See Robert Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 S Ct Rev 329, 389–91.
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Court’s judgment that the ordinance was unreasonable, rather than
calling that judgment into question.
4. Washington v Glucksberg.
122

Washington v Glucksberg rejected a claim that there is a substantive due process right to physician-assisted suicide; it upheld a Washington statute forbidding assisted suicide against a challenge raised on
behalf of a terminally ill patient. Glucksberg did not modernize the law,
but it demonstrates the modernizing function of today’s substantive due
process: there is good reason to think that the case came out the way it
did because the justices were convinced that the Washington statute,
and other state statutes like it, actually did reflect current sentiment—
not a bygone era—and did not need to be modernized.
The Court in Glucksberg, as in other modern substantive due
process decisions, emphasized that the courts should recognize only
123
“fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal tradition.”
And the Court asserted that there was “a consistent and almost univer124
sal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right” to assisted suicide. But that was not really an adequate answer to the claim that was
being made in the case. The claim was that individuals who are nearing
the end of their lives are entitled to determine the manner and time of
their own deaths. To refer to this simply as “assisted suicide” is obviously too crude a characterization. Indeed, it is not clear that a majority of the Court accepted the characterization; five justices indicated their willingness to accept a qualified right to physician-assisted
suicide in certain circumstances, notwithstanding the traditional pro125
hibitions that the majority opinion stressed.
Moreover, ancient prohibitions on assisted suicide, as applied to
end-of-life situations, seem to be prime candidates for modernization.
The problem that gives rise to the claim of a right to die is a product

122

521 US 702 (1997).
See id at 722.
124 Id at 723.
125 See id at 736–38 (O’Connor concurring) (declining to reach the “narrower question” of
whether a dying person has a constitutional interest in controlling his death); id at 738–52 (Stevens concurring in the judgment) (encouraging further debate about the appropriateness of
punishment for attempted suicide); id at 752–89 (Souter concurring in the judgment) (finding
“merciful termination” to be consistent with a physician’s ethical obligations); id at 789 (Ginsburg concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with O’Connor); id at 789–90 (Breyer concurring in
the judgment) (seeing the question as whether a terminally ill patient has the right to die a dignified death and finding more support for an affirmative answer to this question than to the one
asked by the majority, whether a terminally ill patient has a right to physician-assisted suicide).
123
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of modern medicine; the problem simply did not exist, in anything
remotely like the same form, until relatively recently. This could easily
be an area where the laws on the books do not reflect current, considered judgments on the disputed issue.
The Court, to its credit, seemed to realize as much. It did not stop
with the irrefutable but too-simple claim that it has long been illegal to
assist a suicide. The Court emphasized, at several points in its opinion,
that state legislatures, including Washington’s, had reconsidered the old
statutory prohibition against assisted suicide and had reaffirmed its application to the new end-of-life situations. At the outset of its opinion,
the Court noted that Washington had addressed the issue by legislation
enacted in 1979; that the voters in Washington had rejected an initiative
in 1991 that would have permitted physician-assisted suicide; and that
the law had been amended in the following year to make even more
126
explicit the prohibition on assisted suicide. And the Court gave a
lengthy explanation of why modernization was not needed:
Though deeply rooted, the States’ assisted-suicide bans have in
recent years been reexamined and, generally, reaffirmed. Because
of advances in medicine and technology, Americans today are increasingly likely to die in institutions, from chronic illnesses. Public concern and democratic action are therefore sharply focused
on how best to protect dignity and independence at the end of
life, with the result that there have been many significant changes
in state laws and in the attitudes these laws reflect. . . . At the
same time, however, voters and legislators continue for the most
part to reaffirm their States’ prohibitions on assisting suicide.
...
Thus, the States are currently engaged in serious, thoughtful ex127
aminations of physician-assisted suicide and other similar issues.
128

In a companion case to Glucksberg, Vacco v Quill, the Court, in
the course of rejecting an Equal Protection Clause challenge to a New
York statute forbidding physician-assisted suicide, emphasized that “the
overwhelming majority of state legislatures have drawn a clear line between assisting suicide and withdrawing or permitting the refusal of
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment by prohibiting the former and

126
127
128

See Glucksberg, 521 US at 706–07, 716–17.
Id at 716, 719.
521 US 793 (1997).
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129

permitting the latter.” That is, the laws forbidding physician-assisted
suicide were the opposite of outliers. The Court in Vacco also noted that
New York had repeatedly reexamined its statutes and reaffirmed the
130
ban on physician-assisted suicide. On modernization grounds, the case
for upholding the Washington and New York laws was very strong.
The Court did not say that it would have established a right to die
if there were no evidence of modernization. But by the same token,
the Court was plainly influenced by the fact that this was an issue that
the political branches were seriously addressing. The Court thus invited arguments in future cases that might distinguish Glucksberg, and
urge that statutes be invalidated, on the ground that circumstances
and attitudes have changed in a way that makes the old statutes, whatever their traditional pedigree, outmoded. In all of these ways, Glucksberg fits squarely into the modernization paradigm.
5. Lawrence v Texas.
Lawrence v Texas, the most recent substantive due process case,
struck down a Texas statute that made consensual same-sex sodomy a
crime. Much of the opinion is devoted to elaborating the contours of the
term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause. But in deciding what “liberty”
meant, the Court used, among other things, a more or less explicit
modernizing approach. In addition, the Court’s definition of “liberty”
left many things undecided—significantly, for modernization purposes.
131
In Bowers v Hardwick —the decision, overruled by Lawrence,
that had upheld a Georgia sodomy statute—the Court had emphasized its view that homosexual sodomy, far from being a traditional
132
right, had traditionally been condemned. The Court in Lawrence
133
took issue with the Bowers Court’s account of tradition. In the end,
though, Lawrence could assert only that “the historical grounds relied
upon in Bowers are more complex” than the Bowers Court had sug134
gested. In other words, the Court in Lawrence essentially conceded
that tradition, while not foreclosing the conclusion that the Texas statute was unconstitutional, did not really support that conclusion.

129

Id at 804–05.
Id at 806–07.
131 478 US 186 (1986).
132 See id at 190–94.
133 See Lawrence, 539 US at 568–71 (asserting that laws targeting same-sex couples, far
from having “ancient roots,” only emerged in the last third of the twentieth century).
134 Id at 571.
130
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The Lawrence Court then shifted the focus from tradition to current understandings: “In all events,” the Court said, “our laws and traditions in the past half century”—rather than those of previous centu135
ries—“are of most relevance here.” Those more recent developments, according to the Court, “show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to
136
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.” The Court
then reviewed a variety of sources that supported its claim about the
“emerging awareness”: the Model Penal Code; the Report of Britain’s
Wolfenden Commission, which called for the repeal of laws punishing
homosexual conduct; Parliament’s favorable response to that Commission; a decision of the European Court of Human Rights holding
that laws forbidding homosexual conduct were a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights; and, in the United States, the fact
that, according to the Court, of the twenty-five states that criminalized
sodomy at the time of Bowers, only thirteen still had such prohibitions,
137
and just four “enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct.”
The Lawrence Court’s emphasis on an “emerging awareness” is
an explicit commitment to modernization. The problem with the Texas
statute was not that it deprived people of a right “deeply rooted in this
138
Nation’s history and tradition.” Rather, the Texas statute was, if anything, too much the product of old ways of thinking; it was something of
an outlier that had, in the Court’s estimation, little support in current
sentiment. It was barely enforced, and current trends in the law were
against it. In all of these respects, Lawrence adopted a modernizing approach in defining the rights protected by substantive due process, perhaps more explicitly than any other substantive due process decision.
As far as the other aspect of modernization is concerned—the susceptibility to a reaction from the political branches—the Lawrence
Court’s definition of liberty quite clearly did not leave open the possibility that the legislature might modify the sodomy law in a way that would
make it constitutional. In that sense, Lawrence was not like Eisenstadt
or the capital punishment cases. But in its own way, the Lawrence Court
did unquestionably invite a response from the political branches, by
writing an opinion that committed the Court only to a narrow principle.
The only thing that seems clear after Lawrence is that it is unconstitutional to impose criminal penalties for sodomy. The elements
135
136
137
138

Id at 571–72.
Id at 572.
Lawrence, 539 US at 572–73.
Glucksberg, 521 US at 721, quoting Moore, 431 US at 503.
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of “emerging awareness” that the Court identified—the outlier status
of Texas’s law, the relative lack of enforcement, the trend away from
outlawing homosexual sodomy—all suggest that there will be no effort to revive laws forbidding same-sex sodomy. On all other issues,
the Lawrence opinion resolves little or nothing. The Court went out of
its way to insist that it was not deciding whether there is a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, and it did not decide whether states
139
could discriminate against homosexuals in other ways. In the term
after Lawrence was decided, the Court denied certiorari in a case that
challenged a Florida statute (itself unique in the nation) that forbade
140
gays to adopt —thus arguably confirming that the Court does not
believe that Lawrence has decisively settled anything beyond the unconstitutionality of laws that criminalize same-sex sodomy.
In this way, the Court has very much left the door open for the
political branches to tell it that popular sentiment will not support any
extension of Lawrence. Lawrence may become the basis for a substantial extension of the rights of gays and lesbians; or it may become relatively insignificant, a largely symbolic invalidation of a seldomenforced statute. The Court left all of that undecided, thus allowing
itself the opportunity to see the political reaction. In this respect, too,
Lawrence is a modernizing decision, of a piece with modern substantive due process and far removed from the pre–New Deal era. The
criticism of Lawrence is more likely to be not that it is antidemocratic
in an important way, but that it does not go far enough.
III. WHAT MODERNIZATION IS NOT
All of these examples of modernization from recent decades
might seem to have two things in common. First, they seem insensitive
to values of federalism. The idea that modernization involves the suppression of outliers suggests that modernization is, by nature, a centralizing approach, one that limits local or regional diversity in favor of a
nationally uniform trend that, in the courts’ view, is ascendant. The
second apparent feature of these cases is that the decisions that engaged in modernization are all “liberal” in the sense in which that
term is commonly used to describe Supreme Court decisions. The abolition of capital punishment, limits on sex discrimination, and the
139 See Lawrence, 539 US at 585 (stating that “other reasons exist to promote the institution
of marriage beyond mere disapproval of an excluded group”). See also Mary Anne Case, Of
“This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 S Ct Rev 75, 80–83, 133–37.
140 See Lofton v Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F3d 804, 811–12 (11th Cir
2004), cert denied, 125 S Ct 869 (2005).
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various substantive due process decisions all are commonly characterized in that way. More generally, the term “modernization” might be
taken to suggest progress, as if the decisions necessarily move the law
to a more “modern,” and therefore better, state of the world.
Modernization does have centralizing tendencies. The courts will
treat a statute’s outlier status as evidence that it is archaic, and that
creates a bias toward centralization. This is, as I will discuss in my assessment of modernization, a problem with the modernizing approach;
it will sometimes not give enough weight to local variations that justify
unusual laws, or laws that seem outmoded. Modernization will also
tend to be centralizing because it will usually be more difficult to declare that a federal statute is out of touch with popular sentiment than
it will be to say that about a state statute.
But it is not impossible to say that an act of Congress is a relic of
an earlier time; several of the Supreme Court’s sex discrimination cas141
es involved federal statutes. Beyond that, while modernization tends
to be centralizing, it will not inevitably lead to centralizing results. If
the trend is toward limiting federal power and restoring power to the
states, modernization might be decentralizing. There are some arguable examples of this, in recent and not-so-recent history.
More unequivocally, there is certainly nothing about modernization that leads to “liberal” results. Nor is there anything about modernization that necessarily leads to results that are more advanced or “modern” as judged by some normative standard. Modernization means that
the Court is anticipating what it believes to be trends, and in particular
what it believes to be salutary trends. Those trends may be decentralizing, rather than centralizing. And those trends certainly need not be
liberal, or progressive, or good as judged by any standard other than,
perhaps, the justices’.
Two sets of cases illustrate these points; these cases are definitely
not centralizing and not “liberal,” and while they are not as clear examples of modernization as the ones I have already described, they do
follow the modernization approach quite closely. In any event, they
show that modernization does not have to be centralizing, or “liberal,”
or, for that matter, good in any sense.
One example is the Supreme Court’s recent decisions about the
142
scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. In United
141 See, for example, Goldfarb, 430 US at 201–02 (holding that certain provisions of the
Social Security Act violated due process and equal protection); Weinberger v Wiesenfeld, 420 US
636, 637–39 (1975) (same).
142 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 3 (“Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o regulate commerce. . .”).
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144

States v Lopez and United States v Morrison, the Supreme Court, for
the first time in sixty years, ruled that Congress had exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause. Lopez struck down an act of Con145
gress that prohibited the possession of firearms near a school; Morrison declared unconstitutional central features of the Violence Against
146
Women Act. The opinions in these cases were not explicitly written
in modernizing terms, but two features of the cases, at least, are consistent with the modernization paradigm.
First, these cases were decided at a time when public sentiment
had swung against federal regulation. Arguments against federal regulation of the economy began to gain credence in the late 1970s, essen147
tially for the first time since the New Deal. The Carter Administration deregulated the airline industry and began to deregulate the
148
trucking and oil industries. The Reagan Administration made it a
149
priority to reduce federal regulation of the economy, and President

143

514 US 549 (1995).
529 US 598 (2000).
145 514 US at 551 (holding that the Gun-free School Zones Act exceeded congressional
authority because possession of a gun near a school was not economic activity that substantially
affected interstate commerce).
146 529 US at 601–02 (holding that Congress lacked Commerce Clause authority to enact a
statute that provided a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence).
147 See, for example, Alfred E. Kahn, The Political Feasibility of Regulatory Reform: How
Did We Do It?, in Leroy Graymer and Frederick Thompson, eds, Reforming Social Regulation:
Alternative Public Policy Strategies 247, 249–50 (Sage 1982) (noting the emergence of “revisionist
scholarship” from approximately 1956 to 1981, which viewed regulation as mostly in opposition
to the public interest).
148 On airline deregulation, see Air Cargo Deregulation Act, Pub L No 95-163, 91 Stat 1278
(1977), codified as amended at 49 USC § 40101 et seq; Jimmy Carter, Remarks on Signing S. 717
and H.R. 6010 into Law, 13 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 1741, 1742–43 (Nov 9, 1977) (stating that
airlines exclusively hauling cargo could now operate according to the “workings of the market”);
Airline Deregulation Act, Pub L No 95-504, 92 Stat 1705 (1978), codified as amended at 49 USC
§ 40101 et seq; Jimmy Carter, Remarks on Signing S. 2493 into Law, 14 Weekly Comp Pres Doc
1837, 1837–39 (October 24, 1978) (stating that the Airline Deregulation Act would fight inflation
and lead to low-price air transportation). For Carter’s plan to deregulate oil, see Jimmy Carter,
Energy Address to the Nation, 15 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 609, 609–14 (Apr 15, 1979). On the
deregulation of trucking, see Motor Carrier Act, Pub L No 96-296, 94 Stat 793 (1980), codified as
amended at 49 USC § 13101 et seq (adjusting the regulatory scheme for motor carriers); Jimmy
Carter, Remarks on Signing S. 2245 into Law, 16 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 1261, 1261–65 (July 1,
1980) (“This act will bring the trucking industry into the free market system where it belongs.”).
149 See Economic Report of the President 4–5, 7–8 (GPO 1982) (noting the administration’s goal
of drastically reducing federal government intervention, other than that of closely reviewing all regulatory activity); Gregory B. Christiansen and Robert H. Haveman, The Reagan Administration’s Regulatory Relief Effort: A Mid-term Assessment, in George C. Eads and Michael Fix, eds, The Reagan
Regulatory Strategy: An Assessment 49, 67 (Urban Institute 1984) (noting that President Reagan
wanted to deregulate the economy in light of empirical data in the Economic Report of the President of 1982, which suggested that regulation had been detrimental to the economy during the 1970s).
144
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William Clinton famously declared, “The era of big Government is
150
over.” In these circumstances, the Court might reasonably have
thought that an extensive federal regulation of the economy was an
anachronism, and that a narrower interpretation of the Commerce
Clause would help move the nation toward the new consensus.
Consistent with the modernization approach, the opinions in Lopez
and Morrison establish only a vague standard for determining when
legislation is unauthorized by the Commerce Clause; indeed in Lopez
151
the Court conceded as much. In this way those decisions resemble
Lawrence: the decisions could either be the first step in a major constitutional development or relatively minor decisions that had little effect.
The vagueness of the standard left the door open for the Court to re152
treat—as it arguably did, in Gonzales v Raich, when it upheld a federal law forbidding the cultivation of marijuana, as applied to an individual who grew it at her own home, for her own use, as authorized by
153
state law. Raich was not an instance of the Court retreating in the face
of public opinion, as it did in the capital punishment cases. But it may be
seen as an effort by the Court to calibrate the degree of federal regulatory power that would be tolerated—or, perhaps, insisted upon—by the
public and other political actors. The possibility that Lopez and Morrison might undermine federal criminal law enforcement, particularly of
the drug laws, was not acceptable. But it is hard to identify a principled
distinction between Raich and the earlier cases; the difference is one of
practical or, perhaps, political acceptability.
The otherwise unprincipled nature of these Commerce Clause
decisions; the responsiveness to perceived political, or at least policy,
imperatives; and the congruence between the decisions and broad
political currents—all of these things suggest that these cases have an
affinity to the modernization approach. Yet they are decentralizing,
not centralizing, and they would not ordinarily be called “liberal.” It
seems too much to say that these cases are examples of modernization
comparable to the others I have canvassed, but they come close
enough to show that modernization need not be centralizing.

150 William J. Clinton, Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union, 32 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 90, 90 (Jan 23, 1996) (“We know, and we have worked to give
the American people a smaller, less bureaucratic Government in Washington. And we have to
give the American people one that lives within its means. The era of big Government is over.”).
151 See Lopez, 514 US at 565.
152 545 US 1 (2005).
153 See id at 32–33 (citing the “undisputed magnitude of the commercial market for marijuana” as a reason to uphold the federal law).
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A second example, from more than a century ago, should clinch the
point that there need be nothing progressive or admirable, or centraliz154
ing, about the modernization approach. In The Civil Rights Cases, the
155
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the Civil Rights Act of 1875.
That statute forbade discrimination on the basis of race in public accom156
modations and public transportation. The Court held that Congress
did not have the power to enact the statute, because the Fourteenth
157
Amendment did not reach private conduct and discriminations in pub158
lic accommodations and transportation were not “badges” of slavery.
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was the most far-reaching of the
159
post–Civil War statutes protecting the rights of African-Americans.
But it became law when popular support for protecting the rights of the
160
recently freed ex-slaves had just crested and was about to recede. In
fact, it was enacted by a lame-duck Congress, dominated by Radical
Republicans whose views on race had been thoroughly repudiated in
the election of 1874, and who barely managed to maneuver the legisla161
tion through Congress before they left office in March of 1875. By
the time The Civil Rights Cases were decided in 1883, national sentiment had decisively shifted, and Reconstruction had been aban154

109 US 3 (1883).
See id at 24–26 (stating that Congress had no authority to pass such a law under the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment). I am indebted to Barry Cushman and Michael Klarman for the
idea that The Civil Rights Cases are an example of modernization.
156 Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat 335, 336 (requiring that all “citizens of every race and
color” shall not be deprived of “full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations . . . of inns
[and] public conveyances”).
157 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 US at 11 (“Individual invasion of individual rights is not
the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] amendment.”).
158 See id at 25 (“Mere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as
badges of slavery.”). In 1964, the Court upheld the similar public accommodations provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
See Katzenbach v McClung, 379 US 294, 304–05 (1964) (holding that Congress could proscribe
racial discrimination in restaurants that profited from interstate business); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc v United States, 379 US 241, 261–62 (1964) (upholding public accommodations provisions
that applied to a motel serving interstate travelers). But that expansive interpretation of the
Commerce Clause was, of course, not accepted until after the New Deal. See, for example, NLRB
v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 US 1, 46–47 (1937) (holding that Congress has authority to
protect the right of employees to organize, as labor disputes can disrupt interstate commerce).
159 See, for example, Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877
556 (Harper & Row 1988) (“[T]he law represented an unprecedented exercise of national authority, and breached traditional federalist principles more fully than any previous Reconstruction legislation.”).
160 See Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the
Struggle for Racial Equality 49 (Oxford 2004) (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was
passed “when Republican commitment to racial equality was near its zenith”).
161 See Foner, Reconstruction at 553–56 (cited in note 159).
155

File: 05 Strauss MINI Flip 05.21

2009]

Created on: 5/22/2009 10:19:00 AM

Last Printed: 5/22/2009 2:26:00 PM

The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review

897

162

doned. A modernizing Court would have been entitled to conclude
that the nation’s experiment with far-reaching federal intervention to
protect civil rights had come and gone, and that the 1875 Act reflected
views that were no longer widely held.
Similarly, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was, in a pattern typical of
modernization, essentially unenforced by 1883. The Act could be enforced only through private litigation by the victims of discrimination;
African-Americans lacked the organizational and financial resources to
sue, and by 1883 they were subject to intimidation, often violent intimidation. As a result, by the time of The Civil Rights Cases, the statute was
163
“a dead letter.” What was said in Griswold and Lawrence about the
164
“total nonenforcement . . . and apparent nonenforcibility” of the statute
could have been said in The Civil Rights Cases as well. The Civil Rights
Cases did not explicitly leave room for the Court to retreat, but, of
course, the Court did ultimately change course—shifting its interpreta165
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1968, and, in 1964, using the
166
Commerce Clause to uphold legislation similar to the 1875 Act. In all
of these respects The Civil Rights Cases conform closely to the modernization paradigm.
Lopez, Morrison, and The Civil Rights Cases could have been written as modernizing decisions, much like the substantive due process or
Eighth Amendment or sex discrimination cases. That is, the Court in
Lopez, Morrison, and The Civil Rights Cases could have relied on an
“emerging awareness” of the undesirability of extensive federal regulation, as revealed in a pattern of legislation. The Civil Rights Cases
could have emphasized the lack of enforcement of the statute that the
Court was invalidating along with other indications of the lack of a
national consensus behind the legislation. The opinions were not explicitly written in those terms, but the support those cases get from the
modernization approach demonstrates that that approach is not always or necessarily centralizing, and that there is no reason to think
that modernization produces results that are either politically “liberal”
or “modern” in the sense of being morally better.

162 On the end of Reconstruction, see id at 587–601 (discussing generally the economic and
social reasons behind the abandonment of Reconstruction and that abandonment’s societal impact).
163 See id at 556; Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights at 49 (cited in note 160).
164 See Griswold, 381 US at 506 (White concurring in the judgment).
165 See, for example, Jones v Alfred H. Mayer Co, 392 US 409, 412–13 (1968) (holding that a
statute requiring equal treatment in the conveyance of real property is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Thirteenth Amendment).
166 See note 158.
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IV. MODERNIZATION: AN ASSESSMENT
On the surface, the modernization approach seems vulnerable to
fundamental objections. In a word, why shouldn’t modernization be
the job of officials who must face the electorate periodically and who
are periodically replaced, rather than the job of politically insulated,
long-tenured judges? More precisely, there are problems of both legitimacy and institutional competence. The competence problem is that
it is not obvious why judges are any good at deciding when statutes
have become anachronistic, especially compared to elected politicians
whose job depends on their ability to stay in touch with society. The
legitimacy problem is that even if judges were good at making that
decision, it is not clear why they should be the ones who make it, when
that entails giving them the power to invalidate laws adopted by representatives with much better democratic credentials.
There are problems with the modernization approach, but these
difficulties of competence and legitimacy are less severe than they
seem at first. The actual problems of modernization, I believe, are different and more subtle. As far as legitimacy and competence are concerned, modernization of the kind practiced by the Supreme Court
has an affinity with respectable legal traditions—the common law, the
so-called Carolene Products justification of judicial review, some wellknown theories of statutory interpretation, and the approach to constitutional adjudication that is associated with the term “passive virtues.”
The real problem with modernization may be not so much that it
leads to judicial overreaching as that it leads to a kind of abdication. It
can cause the courts to back away from playing a role for which courts
are relatively well suited and the elected branches are not well
suited—and that some institution should play in a democracy. I will try
to illustrate that last point by discussing the two most famous decisions of the last half century, Brown and Roe, both of which are, in an
important sense, modernizing cases.
A. Legitimacy and Competence
Modernization, perhaps surprisingly, resembles several approaches
or legal traditions that, if not fully accepted, are at least plausible and
familiar. To begin with, modernization belongs to the same family as the
167
famous United States v Carolene Products, Co footnote. The Carolene
Products approach calls for the courts to give less deference to statutes

167

304 US 144 (1938).
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when, among other things, the democratic political process is not working as it should—either because a law has blocked avenues of change,
for example by manipulating the franchise or limiting dissent, or because the law disadvantages a group that does not have its fair share of
168
political power (a “discrete and insular minorit[y]”).
Modernization can be defended as legitimate in the same way
that the Carolene Products approach can be defended. The ambition
of both approaches is to reconcile judicial review with democracy by
limiting the courts’ interventions to instances in which the courts can
perfect, rather than override, the workings of the democratic political
process. Both approaches, if they work as they should, bring about the
state of affairs that the democratic process would have produced if it
were functioning well. In principle, then, there is no tension between
judicial review and well-functioning democratic government under
either approach. Carolene Products addresses, and is limited to, certain
kinds of deficiencies in the democratic process—blockages in the deliberative or electoral process, or the victimization of minorities that
lack their fair share of political power. The modernization approach is
less clear about the specific deficiencies it is remedying, but, like Carolene Products, modernization is based on the idea that the courts will
strike down only laws that a well-functioning democratic process
would already have gotten rid of.
It might seem odd to associate Carolene Products with an approach like modernization that justifies substantive due process decisions. The Carolene Products footnote was an effort to bury substantive due process while maintaining a role for the courts, and substantive
due process is the bête noire of the leading defenders of the Carolene

168

The footnote reads, in part:

It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. [Citing cases involving “restrictions upon the right to vote,” “restraints upon the dissemination of information,” “interferences with political organizations,” and “prohibition of peaceable assembly”] . . . Nor
need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at
particular religious, or national, or racial minorities; [or] whether prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
See id at 152 n 4. For an argument that the term “discrete and insular” misdescribes the kinds of
groups that are at a disadvantage in the political process, see generally Bruce A. Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv L Rev 713 (1985).
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169

Products approach. But the substantive due process cases that the
Carolene Products decision rejected were not justified on modernizing
grounds, or on other grounds that could be reconciled with the theory
that the role of courts is to perfect the workings of the democratic
process. Rather, the pre–New Deal substantive due process cases were
seen, by their proponents, as a way of holding back pernicious trends in
170
politics and popular sentiment. The modern substantive due process
cases—decided by judges who are, of course, aware of those cases’ repudiated antecedents—have a different, modernizing justification, one
that emphasizes how consistent they are with trends in popular opinion.
That justification is in principle similar to Carolene Products.
It might also be objected that modernization, as I have described
it, explicitly permits judges to take into account their own views about
the desirability or undesirability of trends. The Carolene Products ap171
proach, by contrast, purports to avoid any such judgments. But it is a
familiar criticism of Carolene Products that its approach in fact re172
quires such judgments. Otherwise, an impermissible blockage of the
democratic process cannot be distinguished from a legitimate political
victory, and an unfairly disadvantaged “discrete and insular minority”
cannot be distinguished from a group that consistently loses out in the
173
political process because it deserves to lose out. The need to make
disputable normative judgments is equally characteristic of the modernizing approach’s judgment that a law should be invalidated because it is out of keeping with popular will.
For this reason, there may be less than meets the eye to the argument that modernization is an illegitimate role for the courts to play
because it amounts to a usurpation of the role of the political
branches. In principle, modernization, like the Carolene Products view,

169

Most notably, see Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 75–77 (cited in note 87).
See text accompanying notes 87, 101–04.
171 This is the central theme of Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 75–77 (cited in note 87) (noting
that the Carolene Products footnote gives a clear indication of how judges should examine the
constitutionality of legislation, which does not include yielding to any personal moral judgments).
172 See, for example, Lewis F. Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 Colum L Rev 1087,
1090 (1982) (noting the subjective flexibility of “discrete and insular”); Paul Brest, The Substance
of Process, 42 Ohio St L J 131, 140–42 (1981).
173 See Brest, 42 Ohio St L J at 136–37 (cited in note 172) (pointing out, as an example, that
under Ely’s approach there would be no justification for applying a relaxed scrutiny test for
regulations targeting burglars, while applying a strict scrutiny test for regulations aimed at homosexuals); Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-based Constitutional Theories, 89
Yale L J 1063, 1073–74 (1980) (noting the confusion over which minority groups are sufficiently
“discrete and insular”).
170
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is a democracy-reinforcing approach to constitutional interpretation.
It defines a role for the courts that is consistent with basic democratic
principles. It does involve judgments of morality and policy, but that is
inevitable; the same thing is true of Carolene Products.
This does raise, however, the question of institutional competence. Modernization, it might plausibly be said, requires judges to be
amateur political scientists. It seems absurd to suppose that courts are
good at anticipating developments in popular opinion—much less that
they are better at that than elected representatives are. Similar objections might be made to Carolene Products—that that decision, too,
requires a kind of amateur political science, to diagnose defects in the
political process and prescribe a cure. But at least Carolene Products is
directed to specific defects—things that elected officials do not do well.
Modernization seems to be directed at the core of an elected official’s
mission: staying in tune with developments in popular sentiment.
In addition, modernization is a way in which a certain kind of
elite opinion—the opinions of the people who end up on the Supreme
Court—helps shape constitutional principles. These opinions do not
determine the principles, because the principles have to be squared
with the evolving trends of popular opinion. But it seems reasonably
clear that part of what is going on in the areas where the Supreme
Court is modernizing—capital punishment, the role of women, homosexuality—is that the justices are hastening along developments that are
occurring anyway but that the justices would like to see move faster.
But all of this again may not be as troublesome as it sounds. Here
the important analogy is not so much to Carolene Products as to the
common law: modernization, in these respects, resembles the traditional role of common law courts. Roughly speaking, a modernizing
court chooses among the trends it sees developing in the same way
that a common law court might choose among precedents. In some
instances, the popular trend (or the precedents) is clear. In others the
trend (or the precedents) does not point in one direction, and the
judges’ choice, although bounded by the precedents or the popular
trends, will ultimately rest on normative grounds. Indeed, one classic
understanding of the role of a common law judge is that he or she is,
to the extent possible, supposed to identify trends, on the basis of related legislation and legislation in other jurisdictions, and anticipate
174
the direction in which the law is moving. That role is similar to what
174 For a classic use of this approach, see the opinion of Justice John M. Harlan in Moragne
v States Marine Lines, 398 US 375, 379–93 (1970) (relying on the trend that every state had
enacted a wrongful-death statute to create a wrongful-death cause of action in the maritime
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modernization requires. In fact, in this respect modernization seems
superior to the Carolene Products approach: Carolene Products defines a new role for courts, one that does not have such a clear connection to the common law tradition.
One important distinction between a court engaging in constitutional interpretation and a common law court, of course, is that a
common law court can be reversed by the legislature; ordinarily a
court that decides a constitutional issue cannot be overruled by a simple legislative majority. But this distinction matters much less when a
court is interpreting the Constitution by modernizing. A modernizing
court is more like a common law court because it is prepared to
change course if the political branches push back. To that extent, the
decisions of a modernizing court, like those of a common law court,
can be overturned by the legislature. And while it does seem anomalous for courts to be doing what is quintessentially politicians’ work—
gauging how the political winds are blowing—that is also a plausible
account of what common law courts do. While the common law of
course involves the interpretation of precedents, it is a recognized
function of common law courts to try to predict future trends and
align the law accordingly.
Of course it does not follow that modernization is a fully justified
approach—only that it is more plausible than it seems. Modernization
is not that different from what courts traditionally do. We might still
be better off leaving modernization to the legislature. For that matter,
we might be better off leaving all constitutional issues to the legislature and forswearing judicial review entirely. The resolution of those
questions depends on unanswered and possibly unanswerable empirical and normative questions. The analogy to the common law does suggest, though, that modernization is at least roughly consistent with the
kinds of tasks that we have historically trusted courts to perform.
Modernization also resembles other, somewhat more controversial—but plausible—proposals. There is a tradition, in the literature on
statutory construction, that urges that courts should self-consciously
bring statutes up to date, either through creative interpretation or
175
(more controversially still) through provisional invalidation. These
context). See also the discussion in Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes
151–52 (Harvard 1982) (providing two examples of courts that examined the overall “topography” of current legislation and dealt with the specific laws at issue accordingly).
175 See, in particular, William N. Eskridge, Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 52–55 (Harvard 1994) (arguing that statutes should be interpreted in a way that takes account of changed
circumstances); Calabresi, A Common Law at 163–66 (cited in note 174) (arguing that courts
should occasionally exercise a nonconstitutional power to invalidate statutes provisionally—
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arguments, while controversial today, have a very respectable lineage
in the view that the statutes should, if possible, be interpreted in a way
that harmonizes them with the common law—that there should be “a
unified system of judge-made and statute law woven into a seamless
176
whole by the processes of adjudication.” This is the tradition from
which the modernization approach is drawn.
B.

Ought Implies Can

Superficially, the modernization approach might seem to resemble
most closely Alexander Bickel’s argument that the Supreme Court
should use the “passive virtues” (a denial of certiorari, prosaically, or a
more questionable manipulation of a rule of justiciability, or a deliberately narrow holding) to delay the enforcement of constitutional
177
principles until popular support develops behind them. But the resemblance is only superficial, and the difference ultimately may reveal
the most troubling aspect of modernization.
The use of “passive virtues” shares with modernization, obviously,
a sensitivity to the risk that the political branches will resist the courts’
decisions and a willingness by the Court to modify its actions in response to that resistance. But for Bickel, the principles that the Court
develops have their source in tradition; the Court must then, as a matter
of practical necessity, retreat from those principles (not in name but in
178
fact) in order to fight another day.
The modernization approach, one might say, makes a virtue out
179
of what Bickel, and others like him, viewed as an unfortunate necessity. For Bickel, there is a potential tension, sometimes severe, between
the principles that the courts propound, on the one hand, and popular
180
opinion, on the other. On the modernization approach, there is no
such tension: the principles themselves are rooted in an estimation of
subject to legislative reenactment—if the court believes the statute is lacking in popular support
or is otherwise inconsistent with the larger fabric of the law).
176 Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv L Rev 4, 12–13 (1936)
(suggesting that a statute should not always be treated as a command to be obeyed literally, but
rather as a “recognition of policy” to be regarded by the courts as “a social datum or as a point of
departure for the process of judicial reasoning”), quoted in Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating
the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 S Ct Rev 429, 431 (discussing the cooperation
between the courts and administrative agencies in the New Deal era).
177 See Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 111–98 (cited in note 1).
178 See id at 127–28.
179 See, for example, Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance
Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court,
93 Cal L Rev 397, 401–03 (2005).
180 See Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 27–28 (cited in note 1).
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how popular opinion is developing. They do not have a source in tradition or something of that kind, as they do for Bickel.
For that reason, under the modernization approach, the accommodation to popular resistance is not—as it is for Bickel—an essentially
unprincipled, sub rosa retreat from the optimal, principled regime: for
a modernizer, the accommodation is the principled regime. The governing idea of the modernization view is that statutes are unconstitutional just because, and to the extent that, they do not reflect true
popular sentiment. If it turns out that the Court has miscalculated, and
the statutes do reflect popular sentiment, then the principled thing to
do is to change course.
The difference between the Bickel view and modernization can
be seen in something that Justice Felix Frankfurter, one of Bickel’s
heroes, said at oral argument in the Brown case, and that Bickel cited
repeatedly: “Nothing could be worse from my point of view than for
this Court to make an abstract declaration that segregation is bad and
181
then have it evaded by tricks.” Bickel added: “There is much that
could be worse than one such declaration, but nothing indeed could
182
be worse than many.” Obviously it would be a bad thing for segregation to be maintained by “tricks,” but Frankfurter’s and Bickel’s concern was not so much with that as with the spectacle of having the
Court back down in the face of popular opposition—“nothing could be
worse.” That idea is antithetical to modernization. For a modernizer,
for the Court to learn that its decisions do not have sufficient support
is not the worst thing that can happen; it is more like business as usual.
C.

Self-validation, Self-nullification, and the Problem of
Judicial Abdication

Even if a modernizing approach reflects a plausible conception of
the judicial role, there are good reasons to criticize it. A Supreme
Court decision invalidating a statute can itself have an effect on the
political process. For that reason, a modernizing decision might be, to
a degree, either self-validating or self-nullifying.
It can be self-validating by giving one side in a political debate—
the side favored by the Court—an advantage. The advantage might be
the ability to claim that an attack on its position is an attack on the
181 See, for example, Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 6, 95
(Yale 1978), quoting Arguments before the Court: Racial Segregation, 21 US L Wk 3161, 3164
(BNA 1952).
182 Bickel, The Supreme Court at 95 (cited in note 181) (“[The Court] can better suffer the kind
of withdrawal that consists of not going forward than the kind that consists of visibly retreating.”).
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legitimacy of the courts or, indeed, an attack on the Constitution.
Brown may have given such an advantage to the civil rights movement; after Brown, the supporters of school desegregation and of civil
rights laws generally were able to claim that the Constitution was on
their side. In that way, a decision that tries to anticipate trends in legislation might end up producing those trends. Alternatively, or in addition, a
“modernizing” decision might give one side to a political debate the advantage of holding an entitlement that must be taken away, instead of
just an aspiration for change. This may have happened in the case of
Roe and the right to an abortion. After Roe, the debate was cast not as
whether women should have the right to abortion but as whether they
can be deprived of that right. Such a reframing of the political debate
can confer an important advantage on the side that is now defending
the status quo.
On the other hand, a modernizing decision might be self-nullifying.
That can happen because a judicial decision might make an issue more
salient than it otherwise would be. Legislative modernization might
take place quietly, in a way that does not arouse much opposition. But
a judicial decision that tries to accelerate the trend may be more visible. The decision will then serve as a rallying point for political opposition, which has the additional advantage of being able to say that it is
attacking an undemocratic decision by judges. This also seemed to
happen after Roe, and indeed there is a much-debated question
whether Roe advanced or hindered the cause of reproductive rights.
Self-validation and self-nullification are defects in the modernizing approach in the sense that they can lead to decisions that are erroneous when judged by the standard of modernization itself. Courts
may succeed in striking down laws that were in fact not obsolete, if the
decision validates itself. Alternatively, if the modernizing decision
produces a backlash, the decision may cause a law to be revived when
it might have died out of its own accord had the courts stayed out of
the picture. Moreover, and partly because a decision can have these
effects on the political process, the modernizing approach is subject to
manipulation. Opponents of a certain kind of law might adopt a strategy of seeking to make the law seem obsolete. This may have been
part of the strategy of death penalty opponents in the years leading up
to the decision in Furman. Knowing that they could not get most capital punishment statutes repealed, they concentrated their efforts on
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183

obtaining stays of executions, so that they could then argue (among
other things) that popular support for capital punishment in practice
was waning—thus inducing a modernizing decision—when in fact
popular support was not. That is, at least, a possible scenario, and it
suggests a way in which the modernizing approach might distort political debate, in addition to being defective in its own terms.
But there is, I believe, a much deeper problem of modernization
that is, in a sense, the opposite of the seemingly more obvious problem
of judicial competence—of the courts’ presuming to do the political
branches’ job. The problem is that the courts may be too ready to yield to
the political process and may therefore fail to vindicate principles that
courts, and courts alone, are well suited to enforce. The two most famous decisions of the last century, Roe v Wade and Brown v Board of
Education, illustrate the point.
1. Abortion.
Abortion is, of course, by far the most controversial area of modern substantive due process. It illustrates the strengths—at least the potential strengths—of the modernizing approach, as well as arguably the
greatest weaknesses. At the time of Roe, there was a trend toward liberalizing abortion laws in the United States. A few states had recently
legalized abortion generally; others had relaxed restrictions, enacting
laws that allowed abortions in cases where the physical or mental
health of the mother was in jeopardy—a standard that, depending on
184
how it was enforced, could allow abortion relatively freely. The Texas
statute that was invalidated in Roe permitted abortions only to save
185
the life of the mother. It was, therefore, arguably inconsistent with an
“emerging awareness”—not to the extent that the statute in Lawrence
was, but still to some degree.
In these circumstances, the Court in Roe could have written a relatively narrow, modernizing opinion, as it did in Lawrence. That is, it
could have invalidated the Texas statute as excessively restrictive, basing its decision in part on the general trend toward liberalization. That
approach would have left intact the abortion laws of many states. Such
an approach would have been roughly congruent with what the Court
did in Griswold, and with what it subsequently did in Moore, as well as
183 See Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the American
Agenda 33–34 (CUP Archive 1989).
184 Roe, 410 US at 140 & n 37 (pointing to fourteen states that had liberalized their abortion
statutes).
185 Id at 119.
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in Lawrence—significantly more intrusive than those decisions, but in
degree rather than in kind.
Such a result in Roe would have been less controversial, and it
could have been the first step toward a gradual expansion of the right
to an abortion. Over time that gradual expansion of the judicially
created constitutional right might have evolved together with the legislative liberalization of the laws to produce a result something like
what Roe tried to produce all at once. This alternative approach would
have taken longer, but it would have been more democratic and therefore potentially more stable, and it would have produced a less polarized and religiously inflected politics on a variety of issues. Or at least
so it has been argued, by a number of people who support the right to
abortion in general terms but criticize the Court for not taking this
186
more gradual approach in Roe —an approach that would have been
more consistent with the modernization paradigm.
The opinion the Court did write—which, of course, invalidated
abortion laws much more sweepingly—is still best seen as an exercise
in modernization. Indeed that may be one of the most satisfactory
justifications for Roe. It is difficult to make a case that there was a
traditional right to obtain an abortion. The right to control one’s bodily integrity, reproductive capacity, and family composition do have
some basis in tradition and the common law, and in constitutional precedents like Griswold, Eisenstadt, and (now) Moore and Lawrence.
The problem comes in explaining why the state’s interest in protecting
fetal life did not override those rights; tradition (and, for that matter,
moral reasoning) seems to be of little help on this point. But the core
idea of modernization—that the trend in the nation as a whole was
toward allowing the abortion decision to be made by individual women—would have provided some basis for the decision in Roe, and that
trend undoubtedly influenced the Court. The more general trend toward a change in the status of women, which underlay the modernizing decisions about sex classifications, also must have played some
role in the decision.
Roe did not appear to leave an opening for the legislature to revitalize abortion laws, as the modernization approach would require.
But that appearance was misleading: the final confirmation that the
abortion decisions were modernizing decisions lies in the Supreme
Court’s response to the determined and protracted political campaign

186 See, for example, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 NC L Rev 375, 382 (1985).
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against Roe. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v
187
Casey, the Court reaffirmed what it characterized as “the essential
holding of Roe v. Wade,” which it described as the right to have a pre188
viability abortion free of any “undue burden” imposed by the state.
But the “undue burden” standard is obviously vague, and in a series of
decisions, including Casey itself, the Court accommodated the political
reaction to Roe by accepting a number of restrictions on the abortion
right. The Court allowed the states to impose a twenty-four hour waiting period; to require women seeking abortions to undergo mandatory
pre-abortion counseling, which could be explicitly designed to discourage them from having an abortion; to require minors to obtain parental consent, unless there were special reasons justifying an exception;
and to impose relatively burdensome recordkeeping requirements on
189
abortion providers. Perhaps most important, the Court upheld sta190
tutes that forbade the use of Medicaid funds for most abortions. The
net effect was to make it significantly more difficult for many women
191
to obtain abortions.
If one were to judge the Court’s abortion rulings as an exercise in
modernization, one might say that, overall, the Court was successful,
even though it made things unnecessarily difficult for itself along the
way. Had the Court begun with a narrower holding in Roe, it might
have succeeded in bringing about the modernization of many states’
abortion laws. The landscape might look much the same as it does today, without all the storm and stress and political fallout that accompanied the battles over Roe. But if the Court’s objective was to broker
a political compromise about abortion that more or less reflected national sentiment, then a plausible case can be made that the Court has,
at this point, succeeded in doing so.
But that conclusion, if it is right, reveals what is arguably one of
the great weaknesses of the modernization approach—that it makes
the courts too willing to accede to political pressure. Of course this
view will be held by someone who believes that the Court should have

187

505 US 833 (1992).
Id at 845–46, 876.
189 See id at 881–901. See also Webster v Reproductive Health Services, 492 US 490, 509–10
(1989) (holding that a ban on certain abortions in public facilities did not violate the Constitution); Gonzales v Carhart, 127 S Ct 1610, 1619 (2007) (upholding an act proscribing certain abortion methods).
190 See Harris v McRae, 448 US 297, 326 (1980); Maher v Roe, 432 US 464, 480 (1977).
191 See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change?
173–267 (Chicago 2d ed 2008) (describing the limited effect of the Supreme Court’s abortion
decisions on the increased availability of abortion).
188
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unequivocally vindicated the right to abortion in all respects. But even
on a more modest view of the judicial role in constitutional cases, modernization, in this setting, may have turned out wrong. It led the Supreme Court to do essentially the opposite of what it should have done.
Specifically, the combination of Roe and the Medicaid abortion
cases—according to this line of criticism—had the overall effect of making abortion more freely available to relatively well-off women, without
making it available to many women who are already disadvantaged—
women who are poor, young, undereducated, and living outside of
urban areas. Because relatively powerful groups in society have an
effective right to abortion, the pressure to expand the right further has
been muted. At the same time, abortion opponents have been appeased at the expense of the relatively powerless.
What the Court should have done, on this account, is to allow the
political process to make the decision about the degree to which abortion laws would be liberalized; but the Court should have insisted that
any such reform make abortion equally available, or equally unavailable, to the rich and poor alike. That way, the political pressure that
relatively well-off individuals would have exerted to reform the abortion laws would have benefited the disadvantaged as well. According
to this line of argument, the Court should have made abortion not a
“fundamental right,” as it did, but instead a “fundamental interest” in
the sense in which that term was used in a series of decisions, principally in the 1960s. In those cases, a “fundamental interest” was a benefit that a state did not have to provide at all (such as the right to vote
in certain elections, or a right to appeal in a criminal case); but if a
state did provide that benefit, it had to provide it equally to all, unless
192
it could show an extraordinary justification for making a distinction.
Had the Court taken that route with the abortion cases, it would
not have been modernizing. It would have been adopting a different
role—a role suggested by Justice Robert Jackson’s celebrated concurring
193
opinion in Railway Express Agency v New York and also by the theory,
192 For an overview, see Geoffrey R. Stone, et al, Constitutional Law 768–844 (Aspen 5th ed
2005). On voting, see, for example, Kramer v Union Free School District No 15, 395 US 621, 622
(1969) (holding that a New York education law violated equal protection where it only granted
certain groups of individuals the right to vote in a school district election). On criminal appeals,
see, for example, Douglas v California, 372 US 353, 357–58 (1963) (“[W]here the merits of the
one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think
an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor.”).
193 See 336 US 106, 112–13 (1949) (Jackson concurring):

[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minori-
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associated with Carolene Products, that the courts should intervene to
protect those groups who are undeservedly powerless in the democratic
arena. On this account, modernization is best left to the political
branches; they will eventually be able to modernize statutes without the
courts’ help. The courts should do things that the political branches
cannot do, such as protecting the politically powerless. There are, of
course, problems with this conception of judicial review as well. But
what this criticism of modernization does suggest is that the problem
with today’s modernizing substantive due process is, in a sense, the opposite of the problem with pre–New Deal substantive due process.
Where the Lochner-era courts were too rigid and unforgiving in their
confrontations with the political branches, modern substantive due
process—that is, modernizing substantive due process—may be too
flexible and too willing to accommodate.
2. School Desegregation.
Perhaps the merits and demerits of modernization are best illustrated by the most celebrated modernizing decision of all, Brown v
Board of Education. Brown was not explicitly a modernizing decision,
and the leading justifications of Brown do not portray it as modernizing. Rather they refer to principles of equality and to the courts’ role
in protecting minorities. But there is evidence that the justices were
strongly affected by the view—common among elites at the time—
that segregation was an anachronism. A national consensus against
194
segregation had been building for a generation. Other decisions that
were not explicitly about race—the line of cases that constitutionalized,
and reformed, criminal procedure in the states, for example—were in
significant part efforts to modernize biased and backward state criminal
justice systems. The most famous criminal procedure decision, Miranda
195
v Arizona, self-consciously chose what the Court considered a more
advanced interrogation protocol—modeled on the one used by the
FBI—and also, following the modernization paradigm, invited a legislative response. And, of course, that aspect of modernization—a sensity must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply
legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if
larger numbers were affected.
194 The definitive account of the background and aftermath of Brown, and particularly of
the tension between distinctively legal and more “political” considerations, is Klarman, From Jim
Crow to Civil Rights at 290–343 (cited in note 160).
195 384 US 436 (1966).
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tivity to the political reaction—was part of Brown as well. The Court
at the time was intensely aware of the political reaction to Brown and
tailored its subsequent decisions accordingly. Most famously, the
second Brown decision allowed desegregation to be undertaken with
196
“all deliberate speed,” and the Court evaded a decision on the con197
stitutionality of antimiscegenation laws until 1967.
The various views that critics and admirers have expressed about
Brown can be seen as comments on modernization as an approach to
judicial review more generally. Did the Court, astutely deciding not to
overplay its hand, accomplish as much as was politically possible at
the time? Or did the Court, too sensitive to political currents and not
determined enough to enforce principle, back off too quickly? The
question whether the Court gave too much ground in the second
Brown decision identifies the unobvious problem with modernization:
that a court, too eager to anticipate public opinion, may overestimate
the extent to which it needs to retreat, and that judicial decisions will
become too attuned to politics instead of implementing principles that
courts are better suited to enforce, compared to the political branches.
The issue posed by modernization is not whether the courts can
operate in isolation from larger political currents. In some sense they
obviously cannot in the long run. This finding is a staple of political
198
scientists’ analysis of the Supreme Court. Modernization has the
virtue of not requiring something from the courts—such as prolonged
resistance to strongly and widely held views—that the courts are unlikely ever to be able to deliver.
But it does not follow that judges and justices should anticipate the
movement of public opinion and align their decisions accordingly. Many
of the political forces that limit the courts will operate without the
judges’ conscious cooperation: only certain kinds of people will be appointed to the courts; only certain legal outcomes will present themselves as realistic possibilities; the pressure of public opinion will make
certain arguments more persuasive even if judges do not deliberately
defer to public opinion. The fact that the courts will inevitably conform
to public opinion to a substantial degree might even be a reason for
judges consciously to resist the tendency to do so. Otherwise they may

196

See Brown, 349 US at 301.
See Naim v Naim, 350 US 891, 891 (1956) (per curiam); Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1, 12 (1967).
198 For the classic statement, see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court As a National Policy-maker, 6 J Pub L 279, 279–81 (1957). See also, for example, Barry
Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich L Rev 577, 578–648 (1993) (“Like all the other
segments of society, courts simply are, and will remain, participants in American political life.”).
197
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not be able to play an important role that no other branch is as well
equipped to play. In the end, that risk of judicial abdication of the proper
role—rather than judicial overreaching into the political realm—is the
greater danger of modernization.
CONCLUSION
The conventional understanding of judicial review is that the
courts should identify and enforce principles that are derived from the
text of the Constitution, interpreted in light of tradition, or history, or
moral philosophy, or the enduring values of American civilization or the
deep wisdom of the People—sources outside of, and above, ordinary
politics. Courts do this because the ordinary political processes fail in
some systematic ways that the courts can correct—they fail to protect
certain kinds of minorities, for example—and the courts can overcome
these failures to a degree by insisting on principles that resist the decisions made by the political branches. At times these principles may have
to be compromised because political realities make it impossible to enforce them, but that is an aberrational and temporary state of affairs.
The modernizing approach to judicial review is at a far remove from
this theory. On a modernizing approach, the principles that the
courts enforce come from, or at least must be reconciled with, the
outcomes of ordinary political processes. Those principles must be
defended as an anticipation of the direction in which the political
process is moving. Constitutional doctrine, according to the modernization paradigm, should be accommodated to political realities not as
a matter of unfortunate necessity and unprincipled expediency but
because that is precisely how constitutional doctrine should develop.
Seen in this light, modernization is a relatively restrained and
modest approach to judicial review. It acknowledges the ultimate supremacy of the democratic process and does not claim that there are
supervening principles of law derived from some other source. It minimizes the risk that a judge will, in Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s
phrase, act like a knight-errant, alone on a misguided mission to attack
199
injustice; anything a court does, on the modernizing view, must eventually be connected back to the democratic process.
The modernization approach also has a plausible answer to the
question of why the attitudes of the demographically exceptional
elites who occupy seats on the courts should play such a large role in
resolving important social issues—perhaps a better answer than any
199

See Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 141 (Yale 1921).
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other theory that authorizes judicial review. The modernization approach does allow an elite to move the law in the direction it considers
better—against capital punishment, in favor of women’s equality and
abortion rights, in favor of rights for gays and lesbians. But, on the
modernization approach, any effort to move the law in that direction
must be justified as an anticipation of how democratic politics is
evolving. If it cannot be so justified, it is not a legitimate movement.
And then the courts must be prepared to retreat if they turn out to be
wrong in their estimate of how popular sentiment is evolving. It is, of
course, not obvious that elite opinion should play this kind of role in a
democracy; a modernizing court, by shifting the burden of legislative
inertia, will often change the outcomes that would otherwise have
been produced. But the underlying premise of the modernization approach to judicial review is that many political outcomes are (and,
arguably, should be) the result of a combination of popular sentiment
and elite opinion.
A modernizing approach to judicial review can coexist with the enforcement of principles that have a source outside of democratic politics. In fact the two coexist in our system today. In some areas, the courts
do not play a modernizing role; the First Amendment seems to be a
relatively clear example. In that area, the courts have identified a role
for themselves and a set of principles that they will enforce. But in the
substantive due process cases, and in other areas as well, the courts do not
seem to have identified a role, or a set of principles, that separates them
from the political processes. The result is a doctrine built around modernization, with the advantages and disadvantages of that approach.
But the progression of the abortion cases after Roe, and perhaps
of the desegregation cases after Brown, raises a basic question about
modernization. Perhaps modernization prescribes a too-quick, or at
least too-complete, judicial acquiescence in the democratic process.
There may be ways for the courts to shape political outcomes, without
assuming the implausible role of the heroic judge who holds out
against prolonged public outrage. Something closer to the Carolene
Products approach—which, unlike modernization, identifies the protection of certain minorities as a central feature of the judicial role—
would be a path of greater resistance for the courts. But it would also
provide a satisfactory way of reconciling judicial review with democracy; it would better explain why the courts are in that business at all;
and it would address a genuine problem, which the modernization
approach, quite possibly, does not. The real question about modernization is whether the proper function of judicial review is to try to correct, rather than simply to facilitate, the operations of democracy.

Readers with comments may address them to:
Professor David A. Strauss
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
david_strauss@uclaw.uchicago.edu

The University of Chicago Law School
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series
For a listing of papers 1–99 please go to http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/1–199.html

200. Susan Bandes, The Heart Has Its Reasons: Examining the Strange Persistence of the
American Death Penalty (January 2008)
201. Susan Bandes, After Innocence: Framing Wrongful Convictions (January 2008)
202. Ariel Porat, Expanding Restitution: Liability for Unrequested Benefits (January 2008)
203. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation and Immigration Law (February 2008)
204. Ariel Porat and Alon Harel, Aggregating Probabilities across Offences in Criminal Law
(March 2008)
205.
Jonathan S. Masur, Process as Purpose: Administrative Procedures, Costly Screens, and
Examination at the Patent Office (March 2008, revised July 2008)
206. Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Should Green house Gas Permits Be Allocated on a
Per Capita Basis? (March 2008)
207. Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights (March 2008)
208. Susan Bandes, Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology of Emotion (March 2008)
209. Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA Unconstitutional? (March 2008)
210. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives
211. Lee Fennell, Slices and Lumps (March 2008)
212. M. Todd Henderson, Citing Fiction (March 2008)
213. Jacob E. Gersen and Eric A. Posner, Soft Law (March 2008)
214. Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive (March 2008)
215. Cass R. Sunstein and Reid Hastie, Four Failures of Deliberating Groups (April 2008)
216. Adam M. Samaha, Judicial Transparency in an Age of Prediction (April 2008)
217. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, & Eric A. Posner, Which States Have the Best (and Worst)
High Courts? (May 2008)
218. Cass R. Sunstein, Two Conceptions of Irreversible Environmental Harm (May 2008)
219. Jonathan R. Nash, The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication (June 2008)
220. Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Documenting Discrimination? (June 2008)
221. Susan Bandes, Emotions, Values and the Construction of Risk (June 2008)
222. Jonathan R. Nash, Taxes and the Success of Non-Tax Market-Based Environmental
Regulatory Regimes (July 2008)
223. Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Depoliticizing Administrative Law (June 2008)
224. Eric A Posner, Erga Omnes Norms, Institutionalization, and Constitutionalism in
International Law (July 2008)
225. Thomas J. Miles and Eric A. Posner, Which States Enter into Treaties, and Why? (July
2008)
226. Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming (August 2008)
227. Jonathan R. Nash, The Majority That Wasn’t: Stare Decisis, Majority Rule, and the Mischief
of Quorum Requirements (August 2008)
228. Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism (August
2008)
229. Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold (August 2008)
230. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment
(September 2008)
231. Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting
Rights Jurisprudence (September 2008)
232. Daniel Abebe and Jonathan S. Masur, A Nation Divided: Eastern China, Western China
and the Problem of Global Warming (September 2008)

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks (abstract only) (September 2008)
Paul J. Heald, Testing the Over- and Under-Exploitation Hypothesis: Bestselling Musical
Compositions (1913–32) and Their Use in Cinema (1968–2007) (September 2008)
Brian Leiter, Nietzsche’s Naturalism Reconsidered (September 2008)
Paul Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Transactional Model
(September 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism (September 2008)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Neoliberal Penality: The Birth of Natural Order, the Illusion of Free
Markets (September 2008)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Abolition in the U.S.A. by 2050: On Political Capital and Ordinary
Acts of Resistance (September 2008)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Supposons que la discipline et la sécurité n’esistent pas ~
Rereading Foucault’s Collége de France Lectures (with Paul Veyne) (September 2008)
Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory and
the Law (October 2008)
Dhammika Dharamapala, Nuno Garoupa, and Richard H. McAdams, Belief in a Just
World, Blaming the Victim, and Hate Crime Statutes (October 2008)
Richard H. McAdams, The Political Economy of Criminal Law and Procedure: The
Pessimists’ View (October 2008)
Richard H. McAdams and Thomas S. Ulen, Behavioral Criminal Law and Economics
(November 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Judging National Security Post-9/11: An Empirical Investigation
(November 2008)
Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Three Approaches (November 2008)
Adam M. Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date (November 2008)
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11
and the Financial Meltdown of 2008 (November 2008)
Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability (November 2008)
Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and
Judicial Independence (November 2008)
Tom Ginsburg, The Clash of Commitments at the International Criminal Court
(November 2008)
Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Afterlife: The Continuing Impact of Thailand’s PostPolitical Constitution (November 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein and Richard Zechkauser, Overreaction to Fearsome Risks (December
2008)
Gilbert Metcalf and David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax (January 2009)
David Weisbach, Responsibility for Climate Change, by the Numbers (January 2009)
Daniel Abebe, Great Power Politics and the Structure of Foreign Relations Law (January
2009)
Brian Leiter, Moral Skepticizm and Moral Disagreement in Nietzsche (January 2009)
Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, (February 2009)
Adam Samaha, Gun Control after Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare
Perspective (February 2009)
Lior Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon (February 2009)
Lee Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons (February 2009)
Adam B. Cox and Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law (March
2009)
Mary Anne Case, A Few Words in Favor of Cultivating an Incest Taboo in the
Workplace (April 2009)

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Rights of Migrants (April 2009)
John Bronsteen, Christopher J. Buccafucso, and Jonathan S. Masur, Welfare as
Happiness (June 2009)
Mary Anne Case, No Male or Female, but All Are One (June 2009)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Alon Harel, Ken Levy, Michael M. O’Hear, and Alice Ristroph,
Randomization in Criminal Justice: A Criminal Law Conversation (June 2009)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Neoliberal Penality: A Brief Genealogy (June 2009)
Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower and Legal Policy (June 2009)
Brian Leiter, Nietzsche, July 2009
David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, August 2009

